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Abstract
Demographic changes are increasingly putting pressure on the financing of European
welfare states. The increase in life expectancy and decrease in fertility lead to an over-
all population aging. Unchanged retirement behavior would lead to an increasing deficit
in the financing of social insurances, including retirement pensions and medical care. As
migrants are on average younger, more immigration could help reduce the age dependency
ratio and improve the financing of social insurances. Several studies have quantified the
effect of migration on the financing of the welfare state and evaluated pension reforms, but
none considers endogenous retirement decisions. Yet, households adjust their behavior after
policy reforms. This study is the first general equilibrium analysis of the effect of migration
and aging on social security financing and of pension reforms with endogenous retirement
decisions. It finds a small to moderate positive effect of migration in Austria and that med-
ical care has an increasing role in the deficit of social security financing. The study finds
that taking constant retirement age overestimates the benefit of migration. It also evaluates
labor market impacts, including endogenous human capital accumulation.
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1 Introduction
The increase in life expectancy and low fertility has large demographic consequences. Population
aging poses strong policy challenges, as retirement and health care needs to be financed by an
increasingly smaller share of the population. Jaag, Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2010) estimate
that the deficit of pension financing in Austria would move from 2.5% of GDP in 2010 to 10%
of GDP in 2050 if no reform is undertaken. Migrants are on average younger and could thus
have a net positive impact on pension financing. Several authors have quantified the impact of
immigration on the financing of social security insurances but none have considered retirement
behavior reactions to policy change, nor taken the increase in health care costs into account.
This study is the first general equilibrium analysis which quantifies the impact of immigration,
population aging and health care on the financing of social security insurances with endogenous
retirement decisions. The analysis is performed for Austria, one of the country with the biggest
pension funding challenge in Europe, and compares the effectiveness of several pension policy
reforms taking into account population aging and migration.
On top of the scientific contribution, our study can also feed in the policy debate in particular for
Austria. Together with Belgium and Germany, the European Commission for instance considers
that Austria has relatively sound public finance management overall but states that “reforms to
address rising age-related costs will be indispensable” (p.5, European Commission (2009)). Pen-
sion reforms carry a heavy political cost and are notoriously difficult. However, the public finance
difficulties following the 2007 crisis have accelerated the implementation of pension reforms in
most OECD countries, including Austria (OECD (2012)).
The increase in longevity and decrease in fertility have been the two main domestic demographic
changes since the end of the second World War. Data and projections from Statistik Austria
illustrate recent variations. Life expectancy was 73 years at birth in 1960 for women, 83 years in
2010 and projected to reach 90 years in 2050. On the other hand, the ratio of newborns to the
population between 15 and 50 has decreased from 0.037 in 1960 to 0.022 in 1990 and 0.018 in
2010. Statistik Austria predicts this figure to stabilize at a comparable low level in the future,
namely 0.021 by 2040.
These demographic changes lead to a population structure with a larger share of old households.
According to projections from OECD (2011b), the ratio of the population aged 20-64 over that
aged 65 and more should decline from 3.5 in 2010 to 1.8 in 2050 in Austria and the EU27. If the
effective retirement age remains unchanged, this means that the number of retired persons that
each worker needs to support would essentially double over the next 40 years, a significant shift
in the distribution of resources across generations in the economy.
The aging of the population poses challenges in other domains than retirement financing. For
example, aging is associated with an increase in health care expenditures. Taking into account
aging and other changes, the share of health care expenditure represented 4% of total output in
Austria in 1960 and increased to 11% in 2009 (OECD (2011a)). One of the detailed patterns on
health care is that expenses are increasing in age. Population aging thus leads to the challenge of
financing age-increasing health care insurance, on top of retirement pensions (Feldstein (2006)).
While longevity and fertility variations have been the main domestic demographic novelty, mi-
gration has been the main change at the international level. Net immigration flows into Austria
have increased almost by a factor 10 between the early 1960’s and the late 2000’s. In 2010, 17%
of the working age population in Austria was foreign born, one of the largest fraction among
OECD countries (Krause and Liebig (2011)).
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Labor market integration of foreign born workers only recently received significant policy atten-
tion in Austria, in part because outcomes have been good over the past decades (Krause and
Liebig (2011)). Immigration poses a number of policy challenges in the economic dimension and
other dimensions, but also carries opportunities. In particular, on average migrants tend to move
to other countries early in their adult life. The average age of foreign households is lower than
that of native households. Migration could thus compensate population aging and increase the
ratio of working age to retired households.
This idea is not new (e.g. Borjas (1994), Storesletten (2000)) and there have been several eco-
nomic studies of the effect of migration on public finances and retirement pensions in particular.
The empirical literature has focused on the effect of migration on labor markets, with few analy-
sis of the public finance impact (e.g. Kerr and Kerr (2011)). The theoretical literature comprises
generational accounting and general equilibrium simulation analysis. This literature generally
finds positive effects of migration on public finances, but these effects are small and insufficient
to deal with the population aging challenge.
Our main contribution to the literature is that we model retirement behavior responses to changes
in policy when population ages and there is migration, which we believe is important when re-
tirement pension reforms are considered. Many existing theoretical models allow for endogenous
labor supply decisions, but only along the intensive margin (hours). There exist general equi-
librium analyses with endogenous labor supply decision along intensive and extensive margins
(retirement, participation and unemployment), taking into account the effect of population ag-
ing, but none which also take into account the impact of migration. A second contribution of our
analysis is to take into account age-dependent health care financing. The study we undertake is
thus the first general equilibrium analysis of the effect of migration on social security financing
with an aging population and endogenous labor supply along intensive (hours) and extensive
(participation, retirement and unemployment) margins. Several studies found that the skill level
of immigrants impacts differently economic outcomes so we use a model with several education
levels, allowing for endogenous decisions in human capital accumulation. We also use a detailed
model of the labor market because the inflow of immigrants can have adverse effects on unem-
ployment insurance outlay, which has to be taken into account when assessing the full effect of
immigration on public finances.
The literature contains general equilibrium analyses of migration and aging effects with endoge-
nous labor supply along the intensive margin (Razin and Sadka, 2000; Storesletten, 2000; Kem-
nitz, 2003; Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoff, 2003, 2004; Schou, 2006; Izquierdo, Jimeno and Rojas,
2010; Lacomba and Lagos, 2010; Jinno, 2011). There are also analyses of the aging effects with
endogenous labor supply along both dimensions (Jaag, Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg, 2010) or a
single dimension (Börsch-Supan and Ludwig, 2010), but without looking at the effect of migra-
tion. The literature also contains analyses of the migration effect in partial equilibrium settings
(Lee and Miller, 2000, for the US; generational accounting studies such as Bonin, Raffelhüschen
and Walliser, 2000, for Germany, Collado, Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Valera, 2004, for Spain and
Mayr, 2005, for Austria) and exogenous labor supply settings (Casarico and Devillanova, 2003;
Leers, Meijdam and Verbon, 2004; Geide-Stevenson and Ho, 2004; Borgy, Chojnicki, Le Garrec
and Schwellnus, 2009), allowing for analysis with multi-country models, endogenous migration,
political economy or other refinements.
Our approach is to extend existing overlapping generations models with demographic changes
and exogenous migration flows. For a better modeling of demographic variations, we use an
overlapping generation structure with age-dependent mortality rates (Grafenhofer et al. (2007)),
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which has been enriched with unemployment and endogenous labor supply decisions along several
margins (Jaag et al. (2010)), different skill levels (Berger et al. (2009)) and exogenous migration
flows (Berger et al. (2011)). We add a more precise modeling of demographic changes using
exogenous fertility rates variations, as well as more precise skill acquisitions by migrants.
We use demographic data and several projections from Statistik Austria on mortality rates,
fertility rates and migration flows between 2010 and 2075 to simulate the impact of population
aging and migration on economic outcomes, including output growth, labor supply and public
finances. Several demographic change scenarios from Statistik Austria are compared, with or
without pension reforms1. These reforms include variations in retirement age, pension benefits
and social security benefits. The model capture households behavior adjustment in saving and
along several dimensions of labor supply, including retirement decisions.
Simulations deliver three main findings. First, the effect of aging on the social security finances
is different if health insurance is taken into account or not. In the main demographic scenario,
the overall social security deficit rises from 6.8% in 2010 to 14.7% of GDP in 2050, while the
retirement pension deficit alone rises from 4.5% to 9.7% of GDP, the difference coming from health
expenditures. Second, taking into account endogenous retirement decisions, migration helps to
reduce the social security deficit in a small to moderate fashion, without resorbing it. An average
increase of about 25% of projected migration in Austria would improve the dependency ratio in
2050 from 50.6% to 48.6%, but migrants also age. As a result, the total social security deficit
would only be reduced to 13.9% of GDP in 2050. To attain a similar social security deficit
without additional migration, the effective retirement age would have to be raised by 1 year,
average social security contributions increased by 6.7% or average pension benefits reduced by
11.2% (compared to the mechanical decrease of 7.9%). To isolate the effect of migration and
aging, government budget is balanced with lump-sum taxes, an unrealistic policy instrument.
Adding distortionary taxes would worsen the deficit. Third, it is important to model endogenous
retirement decisions, as taking constant retirement age bias results on immigration and pension
reforms. Under constant decisions, the average pension benefits would have to be cut by 12.2%
to reach the same deficit reduction as higher immigration, overestimating its benefits.
Policy reforms analyses also show that moderate single instrument reforms would not be able
to contain social security deficit. Moderate to strong increases in the effective retirement age,
reductions in pension benefits and increases in social security contributions would be needed
to keep the social security deficit constant. From the single instrument reforms, increases in
retirement age are the least damaging to economic growth. A simple 2/3 retirement age increase
rule-of-thumb is sufficient for pension financing but not for total social security financing related
to aging, for which a more appropriate rule-of-thumb is 8/7, the difference coming from age-
increasing health costs. Natives adjust their education decisions to compensate for the relative
imbalance in the immigrant skill distribution. Simulations also illustrate the importance of
overall economic growth.
The next section reviews the existing literature and the following one presents the main de-
mographic stylized facts about Austria. Section 4 presents the novelties about the model in a
simplified framework. Section 5 presents and discusses the simulation results of the full scale
numerical model. Section 6 concludes.
1We take the pension policy situation as-is and do not take into account planned future pension reforms.
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2 Literature review
As noted in the introduction, the study we perform is the first general equilibrium analysis of the
effect of migration on social security financing with an aging population and endogenous labor
supply along intensive (hours) and extensive (participation, retirement and unemployment) mar-
gins. In this section, we present previous studies from the literature and highlight the differences
to our analysis.
Surveys by Borjas (1999), Hanson (2008) and Kerr and Kerr (2011) conclude that the empirical
literature on the effect of migration on public finances is still limited. Tentative findings are that
migration has small effects.
There is a large empirical and theoretical literature on the effect of migration on labor markets,
surveyed for instance by Borjas (1999). Textbook theory would suggest that immigration de-
presses the wage of natives because of increased labor supply. As noted by Borjas et al. (2008)
for instance, the literature has however not yet reached a consensus on this effect. As they
discuss, the key empirical finding of Borjas (2003) that immigration depresses native wages and
opposite results by Ottaviano and Peri (2012) critically depend on the assumption made on the
substitutability of native and foreign workers labor supply, which empirically is still an open
question.
Given the focus of the study on migration and public finance, we do not review the literature
on migration and labor markets and refer to Borjas (1999). As noted, the empirical literature
on migration and public finance is limited. We therefore only present and discuss the theoretical
literature on migration, aging and public finance, starting with generational accounting studies
and continuing with general equilibrium analysis.
Mayr (2005) performs a generational accounting analysis for Austria and finds that immigration
has a positive impact on the social security financing taking into account population aging, but
is not sufficient to achieve intertemporal balance. For instance, higher migration flows of about
40% would reduce the intertemporal public debt liability by less than 3%. High skill migration
would be more successful, reaching a reduction of 10% of the liability, but remains insufficient2.
Bonin et al. (2000) reach similar conclusions for Germany, while Collado et al. (2004) obtain
similar results for Spain. For instance, they find that the overall tax burden would need to be
increased by 8.8% to reach intertemporal balance if there was no immigration to Spain, compared
to 7.9% with current estimated migration flows.
Generational accounting provides interesting benchmark information. In particular, it allows
to have a sense of the burden which fall on current and future generations. As noted for in-
stance by Buiter (1997) however, generational accounting does not capture general equilibrium
effects. Feedback effects of factor prices on labor supply provision, including retirement age,
are key behavioral dimensions of the pension system financing. General equilibrium analysis are
thus preferable for evaluating the effect of policy reforms or demographic changes on economic
outcomes.
As noted in the introduction, there is no general equilibrium analysis of the effect of migration on
social security financing with an aging population and endogenous labor supply along intensive
(hours) and extensive (participation, retirement and unemployment) margins.
There exist theoretical analysis of the migration and aging effects with endogenous labor supply
along the intensive margin (Razin and Sadka, 2000; Storesletten, 2000; Kemnitz, 2003; Fehr,
2Deeg et al. (2009) perform a generational accounting for Austria which takes into account the 2005 reforms
(unlike Mayr (2005)) but does not allow to identify the effect of migration.
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Jokisch and Kotlikoff, 2003, 2004; Schou, 2006; Izquierdo, Jimeno and Rojas, 2010; Lacomba
and Lagos, 2010; Jinno, 2011) and there is analysis of the aging effects with endogenous labor
supply along both dimensions (Jaag, Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg, 2010) or a single dimension
(Börsch-Supan and Ludwig, 2010), but without looking at the effect of migration. There are also
analysis of the migration effect in partial equilibrium settings (Lee and Miller, 2000, for the US,
on top of generational accounting studies) and exogenous labor supply settings (Casarico and
Devillanova, 2003; Leers, Meijdam and Verbon, 2003 ; Geide-Stevenson and Ho, 2004; Borgy,
Chojnicki, Le Garrec and Schwellnus, 2009), allowing for analysis with multi-country models,
endogenous migration, political economy or other refinements.
Below we present briefly the various studies and their main findings, starting with the ancestors
of the model that we use.
Grafenhofer et al. (2007) introduce an overlapping generation structure which allows for age-
dependent mortality rates, a feature which is useful for the analysis of demographic changes. To
illustrate the use of this so-called Probabilistic Aging model, authors quantify the effect of some
demographic changes, namely higher life expectancy, but do not consider the effect of population
aging as a whole nor migration.
Jaag et al. (2010) quantify the effect of population aging on retirement pension financing in
Austria using the same overlapping generation structure and detailed labor markets, including
unemployment and endogenous labor supply along several dimensions (hours; retirement; partic-
ipation; unemployed search). They quantify the effect of pension reforms but do neither quantify
the effect of migration nor incorporate age-dependent health expenditures.
Berger et al. (2011) also use the Probabilistic Aging basis, extend it in similar directions as
Jaag et al. (2010), add endogenous human capital decisions, institutional details and exogenous
migration flows. This model is used for a short run evaluation of the medium run impacts of a
partial opening of the Austrian border to foreign immigrants, focusing on labor market outcomes.
This model is the closest to the one we use for the study. The main differences are the focus
of this paper on the long run analysis of fiscal sustainability and a more precise modeling of
demographic changes, taking in particular projected fertility rates into account.
We now present existing theoretical analysis of the migration and aging effects with endogenous
labor supply along the intensive margin.
Razin and Sadka (2000) build an overlapping generation model with a pay as you go (PAYG)
pension system, endogenous education and intensive labor supply in the first period and re-
tirement in the second period. They show analytically that low-skill immigration is a welfare
improvement and public finances are improved if factor prices are constant, for instance if the
country has good access to capital market so that migration has no influence on wages; results
are ambiguous if factor prices are impacted by migration.
Storesletten (2000) uses an overlapping generations model to analyze the effect of increased
immigration on public finances and the PAYG pension system, taking into account population
aging and endogenous labor supply but with exogenous retirement. He finds that immigration
has a positive effect, in particular of high skill immigrants. There is no quantification of the
overall impact of immigration on the social security deficit.
Kemnitz (2003) analyzes the impact of low-skill immigration when labor markets are imperfect
and there is unemployment in a two periods overlapping generation model, where retirement
takes place in the second period. He finds a non-monotonous impact on per capita income:
small volume immigration is first beneficial but then becomes a burden, as low-skill immigration
increases the unemployment rate and thus the need for higher contributions.
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Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoff (2003, 2004) analyze economic growth and pension financing in
a three-regions model of the world, with overlapping generations, endogenous intensive labor
supply, exogenous retirement dates, immigration flows and population aging. Assuming the
same skill returns for natives and immigrants, they find that immigration does little to mitigate
the pension financing deficit created by aging, whatever the skill focus of immigration policy.
Schou (2006) uses a dynamic CGE calibrated model for Denmark with a detailed overlapping
generation structure but assumes exogenous participation rates, which can differ between natives
and immigrants. He finds that increased immigration would affect public finance sustainability in
a very small and negative way. Immigration of high-skill workers would have a positive impact,
but still very small. On the other hand, a better economic integration of (existing and new)
immigrants, so that they have the same participation rates, productivity, etc. as natives, would
have a significant positive impact on public finances.
Izquierdo et al. (2010) use a CGE overlapping generation model with endogenous labor supply,
exogenous retirement dates and differences in skill levels between natives and immigrants, cali-
brated for Spain. They find that more immigration would reduce the pension financing deficit
but not sufficiently to eliminate the deficit. The skill composition of immigration has little effect.
In an overlapping generation model in continuous time with exogenous retirement dates, La-
comba and Lagos (2010) show analytically that voters favor low-skill immigration in spite of a
redistributive PAYG system, since only young voters might suffer from immigration and reduced
pensions, while older workers and retirees will benefit from increased contributions.
Jinno (2011) confirms analytically the result of Storesletten (2000) that only admitting sufficiently
many high skill immigrants can help PAYG funding, in the context of costly assimilation of
immigrants in the labor market (immigrants kids need more time in education to acquire the
same skill level) in a two periods overlapping generation model, where retirement takes place in
the second period.
Börsch-Supan and Ludwig (2010) contend that while the challenge of financing public pension
system with an aging population is well-known, there are few analysis with behavioral reactions
to reforms. Using an overlapping generation CGE model with endogenous labor supply along the
intensive margin and exogenous labor supply along the extensive margin, an aging population
and no migration, they show that combinations of pension and labor market reforms could
easily offset the effect of aging on economic growth and pension financing if there was no labor
supply behavioral reaction. Taking behavioral response into account and keeping pension finances
balanced, there can be large GDP per capita losses, compared to secular growth.
We continue with existing theories of the economic effect of migration in partial equilibrium
and exogenous labor supply settings, often allowing for analysis with multi-country models,
endogenous migration, political economy or other improvements.
Lee and Miller (2000) use a partial equilibrium analysis and find that increased immigration
would have a positive but small impact on the financing of social security in the US, in spite of
the fact that immigrants have lower skills but thanks to their larger fertility, helping to keep the
dependency ratio low.
Casarico and Devillanova (2003) investigate analytically endogenous education decisions, exoge-
nous migration and PAYG pension financing in a two periods overlapping generation model with
exogenous labor supply. In particular they show that a return migration scenario, where im-
migrants return to their country and receive lower benefit after retirement, does not increase
welfare of natives.
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Leers et al. (2004) model immigration endogenously and have a political economy context setting
the tax to finance the PAYG pension system, with a production process without capital and with
inelastic labor supply. They analytically show that the interplay of politics and economics can
lead to emigration in the short run, before benefits of immigration are captured over the long
run.
Geide-Stevenson and Ho (2004) analyze endogenous migration flows between two countries with
overlapping generations which are identical, except for their social insurances and partial PAYG
pensions. Labor supply is exogenous. They find a negative effect of migration along the transition
path due to factor price effects.
Borgy et al. (2010) make a multi-country overlapping generations CGE analysis with endogenous
migration flows, exogenous labor supply and population aging. Migration flows incentives are
derived from an econometric estimation. They find that the financing of the PAYG pension
system improves but the problem is not resolved and that output per capita is decreased by
immigration, because the marginal product of labor is reduced.
3 Demographic change and migration in Austria
This section briefly illustrates the demographic challenges by presenting the key stylized facts
emerging from the official population forecasts of Statistik Austria. Figure 1 shows the change
in relative age group shares from 1952 to 2072, with a clear trend: young age groups lose and
old age groups gain in relative size.
Figure 1: Forecast for population age structure, main scenario
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1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047 2052 2057 2062 2067 2072
Relative shares of total polulation > 15 years, main scenario
15 to 19 years old
20 to 24 years old
25 to 39 years old
40 to 54 years old
55 to 69 years old
70 to 79 years old
80 to 84 years old
85 plus years old
Source: Data from Statistik Austria, main scenario.
The economic implications appear clearly in figure 2. The old age dependency ratio, i.e. the
amount of 65+ individuals in proportion to the group of 15 to 65 year old, increases from around
27% to 50% within the next 50 years. This ratio has economic meaning because the first group
has to be approximately financed by the second group, in the current pay as you go pension
system. While it took about four working age persons in 2010 to finance one retired person in
2010, it will take two persons after 2050.
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Figure 2: Old age dependency ratio for different scenarios
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High migration
Source: Data from Statistik Austria.
The figure even underestimates the actual ratio of the paying-to-receiving population, for two
reasons. First, the working age group contains non labor market participants and unemployed.
For instance, the aggregated participation rate of the 15 to 55 year old was 77% in 2010. Second,
there is a difference between the statutory retirement age (65 for men and 60 for women) and the
effective retirement age, which is considerably lower. The evolution of the effective retirement
age versus the life expectancy at age 65 is shown in figure 3 and illustrates the widening gap3.
Hence, the ratio of the number of people who receive benefits to the number of people who
actually contribute taxes and social security contributions is significantly higher than suggested
by the old age dependency ratio.
Figure 3: Life expectancy at age 65 versus effective retirement age in Austria
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
Life expectancy Effective retirement age
Notes: Time series are averaged over men and women.
Source: Data from Statistik Austria, Main Scenario and OECD.
The main goal of the paper is to quantify the effects of migration on the sustainability of the
3Because of unpredictability Statistik Austria simply leaves life expectancy from 2050 on unaltered while in
principle it could continue to increase.
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Austrian pension system. We again rely on predictions from Statistik Austria and formulate three
different migration scenarios: main, low and high. Figure 4 illustrates the different prediction
scenarios for net migration to Austria. The main scenario assumes a near constant flow of 30,000
net migrants to Austria per year, with a deviation in the low and high migration scenarios of
about 30% in the medium run and about 25% in the long run.
Figure 4: Projected net migration flows to Austria
0
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20.000
30.000
40.000
50.000
60.000
2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047 2052 2057 2062 2067 2072
High migration
Main scenario
Low migration
Source: Data from Statistik Austria.
Table 1 summarizes the age structure of net migration for Austrian and non-Austrian citizens
and shows that net migration to Austria is concentrated at the young age groups. As illustrated
in figure 2, the effect of migration on the dependency ratio is limited but not negligible: the
difference between dependency ratios of the low- and high-migration scenarios can reach 5pp.
Table 1: Age structure of net migration to Austria in 2010
Austrian citizens Non-Austrian citizens Total
absolute in percent absolute in percent absolute in percent
0 to 14 years -544 13.07% 4633 14.54% 4089 14.76%
15 to 19 years -246 5.91% 4113 12.91% 3867 13.96%
20 to 24 years -606 14.56% 8303 26.06% 7697 27.79%
25 to 39 years -2096 50.35% 10605 33.29% 8509 30.72%
40 to 54 years -881 21.16% 3750 11.77% 2869 10.36%
55 to 69 years 163 -3.92% 277 0.87% 440 1.59%
70 to 79 years 4 -0.10% 76 0.24% 80 0.29%
80 to 84 years 17 -0.41% 39 0.12% 56 0.20%
85+ years 26 -0.62% 62 0.19% 88 0.32%
sum -4163 100.00% 31858 100.00% 27695 100.00%
Source: Data from Statistik Austria.
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4 Model description
This section presents the key aspects of the employed simulation model and precisely describes
how migration was added. The numerical simulations are based on a full scale model that in-
corporates additional decision margins and institutional details (like unemployment, endogenous
training decisions and skills, disability insurance, etc.) which will only briefly be commented on
in section 4.7.
4.1 Demography, probabilistic aging and migration
A key task of the model is to realistically capture the demographic structure and its changes
in a given economy. In period t the economy is inhabited by Nt persons who differ along three
characteristics: age (a), skill (i) and nationality (n). The overlapping generations structure relies
on the concept of ’Probabilistic Aging’ (see Grafenhofer et al. (2007)). There is a discrete amount
of age groups A and individuals age stochastically which means that they switch from age group
a ∈ {1, ..., A} to age group a + 1 with a given probability 1 − ωa per period. If a period was a
year then the expected time a person stays in age group a would be 1/(1 − ωa) years. People
start in age group a = 1 at a real age of 15 years. Once the last age group A is reached the
aging probability drops to zero, i.e. ωA = 1. However, life does not end in age group A but
can do so at any stage of life with death probability 1− γa. As aging occurs stochastically two
individuals in the same age group can differ by their life-cycle history α ∈ N at , where N at is the
set of all possible biographies. A biography α is simply a vector that holds the information about
the time an individual has aged from one age group to the other. Hence, the set of completely
identical people that even share the same life-cycle history is Na,i,nα,t . Aggregating over different
biographies gives the number of persons in age group a with skill i and nationality n at time t
Na,i,nt =
∑
α∈Nat
Na,i,nα,t . (1)
The skill distribution can be an endogenous outcome of individual decision making or exogenously
given.4 In any case the skill level is fixed before people enter age group a = 1, hence, there are no
transitions between skill classes during a life-time. We restrict the analysis to three skill classes:
low, medium and high, i.e. i ∈ {l,m, h}. Nationality can be native or foreign, i.e. n ∈ {I, A}.
The main reason to make this distinction is that natives and foreigner will have different labor
market outcomes, including different wages for the same eduation level. The laws of motion per
age-skill-nationality cell are then given as
N1,i,nt+1 = γ
1ω1N1,i,nt +New
i,n
t+1 +Mig
1,i,n
t+1 , (2)
Na,i,nt+1 = γ
aωaNa,i,nt + γ
a−1(1− ωa−1)Na−1,i,nt +Miga,i,nt+1 . (3)
Miga,i,nt+1 is the net immigration flow to the given economy into a specific age-skill-nationality cell
at the beginning of period t + 1. For example, Mig2,m,It+1 refers to the net inflow of natives, i.e.
repatriates minus emigrants, that are part of age group 2 and of medium skill. The inflow into
the first age group does not only consist of net migrants of the same age but also of new entrants
Newi,nt+1to the labor market, i.e. persons born 14 years ago who turn 15 and hence enter the first
4In the full scale numerical model endogenous skill decision is incorporated, while in the simple illustration in
the next section the skill distribution of newborns is taken as given.
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age group. The number of new entrants is derived endogenously
Newi,At+1 =
∑
j
ϕi,jA
(
A∑
a=1
ζ ·Na,j,At−14 · fa,At−14
)
+Mig0,i,At+1 , (4)
Newi,It+1 =
∑
j
ϕi,jI
(
A∑
a=1
Na,j,It−14 · fa,It−14 + (1− ζ) ·Na,j,At−14 · fa,At−14
)
+Mig0,i,It+1 , (5)
and consists of people born in the given economy and net migrants Mig0,i,nt+1 that turn 15 in
t + 1. The total number of newborns depends on the size of an age group and the age group
specific fertility rate5 fa,nt−14, 15 years earlier. The parameter ζ gives the assimilation rate, i.e.
the probability with which the children of foreigners are indistinguishable from natives. This
implies that it takes on average 1/ζ generations until the offspring of foreign immigration has
the same labor market prospects as a native. The parameters ϕi,jn capture skill transmission and
denote the probabilities that parents of skill type j have children of skill type i. Aggregation
over different characteristics can easily be done by summing up
N i,nt+1 =
A∑
a=1
Na,i,nt+1 and N
n
t+1 =
∑
i
N i,nt+1 and Nt+1 =
∑
n
Nnt+1. (6)
4.2 Life cycle optimization
The life cycle consists of up to A age groups and is partitioned into three life stages characterized
by the retirement decision age group ar: the working stage for all a < ar, the retirement-decision
stage for a = ar and the retirement stage for all a > ar. People in groups a ≤ ar face the same
decision problems concerning: participation, consumption and labor supply. Retired persons
just decide how much to consume. The particularity of the retirement-decision stage is that
non-participation is interpreted as retirement which implies different income flows yaα,t than
non-participation during the working stage. Using an actuarially fair reverse-life insurance (see
Blanchard (1985)) one can write the intertemporal budget constraint of an individual as follows
GγaAaα,t+1 = Rt+1Sav
a
α,t, with Sav
a
α,t ≡
[
Aaα,t + y
a
α,t − Caα,t
]
, (7)
where G is the technological growth factor, A denotes assets, y are net income flows, R is the
interest factor and C is consumption. All the individuals have preferences according to the
following Epstein-Zin specification6
V aα,t = max
[(
Qaα,t
)ρ
+ γaβ
(
GωaV aα,t+1 +G(1− ωa)V a+1α′,t+1
)ρ]1/ρ
. (8)
Individuals in age groups a ≤ ar maximize utility with respect to participation δaα,t, hours
worked laα,t and consumption Caα,t. The adjusted level of consumption is given as Qaα,t = Caα,t −
ϕal
(
laα,t
) − ϕaδ (δaα,t), where the effort costs functions ϕal (·) and ϕaδ (·) are convexly increasing.
Retired workers just decide about optimal consumption, hence Qaα,t = Caα,t, ∀a > ar. Migration
is modeled as an exogenous event, hence, there is no active decision when or where to emigrate.
We assume that economic conditions and the pension system in the target country are exactly the
5As the model does not distinguish between males and females the empirical fertility rate has to be corrected,
e.g. by the share of females in a specific age group.
6The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 1/(1− ρ) while individuals are risk-neutral. See Farmer (1990)
and Weil (1990) for details.
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same as in the domestic country from an individual point of view.7 Emigration occurs randomly
because of idiosyncratic personal reasons. This assumption implies that from an economic point
of view individuals are indifferent between emigrating and staying, hence, the occurrence of
emigration does not need to be explicitly modeled for the life cycle optimization. The resulting
optimal consumption-savings decision is governed by a typical Euler-equation
(
Qaα,t
)ρ−1
= βRt+1η¯
a
α,t+1G
ρ−1, (9)
where η¯at+1 ≡ ωa ∂V
a
α,t+1
∂Aaα,t+1
+ (1− ωa) ∂V
a+1
α,t+1
∂Aa+1α,t+1
is the shadow price of a marginal increase in assets,
taking aging into account.
4.3 Labor market and pension system
The per-period income flows are described as follows
yaα,t =

δaα,t · (1− τat ) · yaα,t,par +
(
1− δaα,t
) · yat,npar if a < ar,
δaα,t · (1− τat ) · yaα,t,par +
(
1− δaα,t
) · yaα,t,pens if a = ar,
yaα,t,pens if a > ar.
(10)
where yat,npar is the value of non-participating, such as home production. The value of participat-
ing yaα,t,par = laα,t ·θa ·wt depends on the chosen labor supply laα,t, an age dependent productivity
parameter θa that can also differ depending on skill class and nationality and the wage rate wt.
The pension is given by yaα,t,pens = σR,P νaP aα,t+P a0,t. It consists of a flat part P a0,t and an income
related part νat P aα,t, where P aα,t represents the acquired pension rights and νat is a scaling factor
which can be used to cut or raise pension payments for given pension points. σR,P reflects effects
of the retirement decision on the pension payment in the so-called pension corridor. For a > ar
the corridor does not play a role in which case σR,P = 1. The pension points evolve according to
GP aα,t+1 = R
P,a
[
Maα + U
a · P aα,t
]
, (11)
where
Maα = δ
a
α,t · yaα,t,par, Ua = σP if a < ar,
Maα = δ
a
α,t · yaα,t,par, Ua = σR,P if a = ar,
Maα = 0, U
a = 1 if a > ar.
RP denotes the notional interest rate with which pension claims increase, for example RP = G
would imply full indexation to wage growth. The parameter σP captures the idea that pension
claims obtained in early life can count less than more recent claims. The term σR,P = σP +
σP1
(
δaα,t − δP
)
reflects the institutional characteristic of a pension corridor. If a worker retires
prior to the statutory retirement age, captured by the decision δP , his current pension yaα,t,pens
as well as his pension points for the future will be reduced by a factor σP1 . In anticipation of the
result that labor supply does not depend on particular biographies, the first order condition for
labor supply is
dϕal (l
a
t )
dlat
= (1− τat )wtθa +
γaRP,aλ¯at+1
Rt+1η¯at+1
· wtθa, (12)
7This assumption is clearly only an approximation to reduce the model’s complexity. As the model is later
on calibrated for Austria, where people typically migrate to similar countries like Switzerland or Germany, this
assumption is less harmful than if the model was simulated for a developing country.
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where λ¯at+1 ≡ ωa ∂V
a
α,t+1
∂Paα,t+1
+(1− ωa) ∂V
a+1
α,t+1
∂Pa+1α,t+1
is the shadow prices for a marginal increase of pension
points. Equation (12) has an intuitive interpretation. The marginal costs of increasing labor
supply have to be equal to the net wage rate per unit of labor (first term on the right hand
side) plus the benefit for building up the pension stock (second term on the right hand side).
The second term therefore reflects the built-in tax-benefit link. Let us turn to the optimal
participation or retirement decision. As pension incomes will differ between different biographies
α also optimal individual participation choices would differ which cannot be handled with the
model. Instead it is assumed that individuals within an age-skill cell collectively choose the
optimal participation rate which still allows analytical aggregation over biographies (see section
4.4). The first order condition for retirement can be written as
dϕarδ (δ
ar
t )
dδart
=
[
(1− τart ) yart,par − yart,pens
]
+
γarRP,ar λ¯art+1
Rt+1η¯
ar
t+1
· [yart,par + σP1 P¯ art ] , (13)
where P¯ are average pensions points within an age-skill-nationality cell. Again the condition can
be interpreted intuitively. The marginal costs of marginally increasing the retirement probability
has to equal the net gain of doing so in that period (first term on the right hand side) plus the
benefit of continuing to build up pension points which also includes improving future pensions by
staying in the pension corridor (second term on the right hand side). The first order condition
for participation for age groups a < ar has exactly the same structure and interpretation with
the exception that net income is compared to yat,npar instead of y
ar
t,pens and that the very last
term disappears as the pension corridor is only relevant in the retirement age group.
4.4 Aggregation
Decision making is computed for the smallest set of identical individuals, i.e. Na,i,nα,t . As shown
in Grafenhofer et al. (2007) the outcomes can be analytically aggregated such that the model can
be analyzed without distinguishing between different biographies α. The aggregation of some
variable X is done by summing over all biographies and weighting with the relative shares
Xa,i,nt =
∑
α∈Nat
Xa,i,nα,t ·Na,i,nα,t . (14)
For example, total private consumption per age-skill-nationality cell is given by Ca,i,nt =
∑
α C
a,i,n
α,t ·
Na,i,nα,t . Effective labor supply LS takes both labor supply margins and relative productivity into
account, hence LS,a,i,nt =
∑
α δ
a,i,n
α,t · la,i,nα,t · θa ·Na,i,nα,t . While aggregation of static relationships,
like the first order conditions for labor supply and participation, is simple it becomes more in-
volved for the difference equations for assets and pension points. Aggregation of (7) over all
biographies α without migration and dropping the nationality index leads to
GAa,inomig,t+1 = Rt+1
[
ωaSava,it +
(
1− ωa−1)Sava−1,it ] , (15)
where in case of a = 1 the law of motion is reduced to GA1,inomig,t+1 = Rt+1ω
1Sav1,it , i.e. the
savings of new entrants is zero by assumption. For a proof see Grafenhofer et al. (2007). We
assume that emigrants leave with the average assets of the corresponding age-skill-nationality
cell. Hence, total assets per age group are
GAa,It+1 =
(
1 +
Miga,It+1
Na,It+1 +Mig
a,I
t+1
)
GAa,Inomig,t+1. (16)
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Emigrants leave after having stayed in a specific age group already for some time. In contrast,
when immigrants enter an age group they still have the expected full length in this age group
ahead.8 As average assets should be unaffected we assume that the immigrants arrive with the
average assets of natives that just aged into the new age group a, hence
GAa,At+1 = Rt+1
[
ωaSava,At +
(
1− ωa−1 +Miga,At+1/Na−1,At
)
Sava−1,At
]
. (17)
Next, we assume that pension points are not lost in case of emigration. The government deducts
the pension points of emigrants from the current aggregate pension claim stock per age group
and transfers the points to a separate account P˜ a,I to keep track of its obligations to emigrated
individuals. Once the emigrated worker abroad retires the domestic government transfers a pen-
sion for the points that where collected in the domestic country to the foreign country. We
assume that emigrants age at the same speed and face the same survival probabilities compared
to the natives that stayed. The transfer of pension points works symmetrically for the case of
immigrants who arrive with the average pension points of individuals in the corresponding age-
skill-nationality cell. When they retire they receive a pension based on the imported as well as
domestically earned pension points from the domestic government. The domestic government
is reimbursed by the foreign government for the expenses on pensions based on imported pen-
sion points. The aggregation of pension points works analogously to the aggregation of assets.
Aggregating (11) over all biographies without migration gives
GP a,inomig,t+1 = ω
aγaRP,a
(
Na,it M
a,i
t + U
aP a,it
)
+ γa
(
1− ωa−1)RP,a−1 (Na−1,it Ma−1,it + Ua−1P a−1,it ) (18)
≡ ωaγaΓa,i + γa (1− ωa−1)Γa−1,i.
By the same arguments as above the total pension points per age group are given by
GP a,It+1 =
(
1 +
Miga,It+1
Na,It+1 +Mig
a,I
t+1
)
GP a,Inomig,t+1, (19)
GP a,At+1 = ω
aγaΓa,i +
[
γa−1
(
1− ωa−1)+Miga,At+1/Na−1,At ]Γa−1,i. (20)
After aggregating over biographies a variable Xa,i,nt is interpreted as an absolute number. There-
fore, aggregation over age groups, skill classes or nationality is done by simply summing up,
i.e. Xt =
∑
a,i,nX
a,i,n
t . For example, effective labor supply by skill class is given by L
S,i
t =∑
a,n L
S,a,i,n
t .
4.5 Production
Production occurs in a competitive representative firm taking input prices, i.e. wage rates, the
interest rate and the price of the output good, which serves as numeraire, as given. Using a small
open economy assumption implies that the interest factor R is exogenous9. As changes in the
8Note that in principle Mig refers to net migration. For the timing of asset flows which is required for
accounting we did not distinguish between emigration and immigration within the group of natives or foreigners.
As observed net migration of natives is negative and net migration of foreigners is positive we approximated
outflows by net migration of natives and inflows by net migration of foreigners.
9Miles (1999) investigates the effect of an aging population on savings in a general equilibrium OLG model
with endogenous interest rates and labor supply, but exogenous retirement date. His simulations show that the
saving rate may fall substantially as the working population becomes relatively smaller, but the impact on interest
rates may be small precisely because the labor force also reduces.
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production process are costly variations in the capital stock, these changes are subject to capital
adjustment costs. This prevents unrealistic jumps in the capital stock as a response to different
shocks given that the interest rate is taken as given. Wage rates are determined in three labor
markets depending on the skill-level. The production function is linear homogenous and takes
the following inputs
Yt = F
Y
(
Kt, L
D,l
t , L
D,m
t , L
D,h
t
)
. (21)
The labor inputs from different skill classes are not perfect substitutes. Using a nested CES-
specification we capture the idea that high skill labor and capital are more complementary than
low skill labor and capital. On the other hand, we assume that native and foreign labor are perfect
substitutes per efficiency unit if one conditions on the skill level. The literature has found that
this assumption is not neutral: Borjas (2003) empirically finds that immigration depresses the
wage of native workers while Ottaviano and Peri (2012) find little effects. The main reason that
findings differ is that the first paper assumes perfect substitutability of native and foreign labor
while the second assumes imperfect substitutability. As discussed by Borjas et al. (2008), direct
empirical evidence on substitutability is still inconclusive. For simplicity thus, we follow Borjas
(2003) and assume perfect substitutability.
This implies that after an increase in immigration gross wage rates will be bid down10 in the
short run. Once the capital stock adjusts accordingly this effect will be dampened. Whether
average wages increase or fall in the long run then depends on compositional effects through
changes in the relative sizes of the different skill classes. Formally, the firm maximizes its end of
period value V F which consists of the stream of discounted dividend payments χ:
V F (Kt) = max
It,L
D,i
t
[
χt +
GV F (Kt+1)
Rt+1
]
,
s.t. χt = Yt − It − J (It,Kt)−
∑
i
witL
D,i
t , (22)
GKt+1 =
(
1− δK)Kt + It,
where J (·) denotes the adjustment costs. Hence, in this simple illustration labor demands are
pinned down by the marginal products and the wage rates, i.e. YLD,i = wi.
4.6 Government budget and market clearing
Equation (23) gives the primary balance, equal to public revenue minus public expenditure:
PBt =
∑
a,i,n
τat δ
a,i,n
t y
a,i,n
t,par −
∑
i,n
(
1− δar,i,nt
)
yar,i,nt,pens −
∑
a≥ar,i,n
ya,i,nt,pens (23)
− g¯ ·Nt −
∑
a,i,n
g¯at,health ·Na,i,nt + P˜ a,It + P˜ a,At .
The revenues from labor income taxation are given in the first line. The second term in the first
line gives the expenditure on retirees. The second line holds expenditure on exogenous public
consumption which is proportional to the total population11 and health expenditure which is age
group specific. The last two terms reflects pension payments to emigrated natives P˜ a,It < 0 and
10In the full scale model also unemployment increases in addition.
11Imagine for example how a higher total population also induces higher costs for infrastructure, etc. On
the other hand, public consumption can have a pure public goods character, e.g. expenses for defense that are
only weakly related to the total size of population, see e.g. Lee and Miller (2000). As the first type of public
consumption is more relevant in Austria, we chose the assumption of proportionality.
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payments received from other governments for foreigners who immigrated P˜ a,At > 0. Government
issues debt debt DG which evolves according to:
G DGt+1 = Rt+1 (DGt − PBt) (24)
The trade balance TB gives the difference of domestically produced and consumed units of the
numeraire good. Note that we have to take the trans-border transfers of pension payments into
account:
TBt = Yt − It − Jt − Ct − P˜ a,It − P˜ a,At − g¯ ·Nt −
∑
a,i,n
g¯at,health ·Na,i,nt . (25)
Foreign assets evolve according to the size of the trade balance. In addition, foreign assets have
to be adjusted because emigrants and immigrants take their assets with them. Due to lack of
data we had to neglect remittances that immigrants would transfer to their country of origin:
G DFt+1 = Rt+1 (DFt + TBt) +
∑
a
Miga,It+1
GAa,It+1
Na,It+1
+
∑
a
Miga,At+1
Rt+1Sav
a−1,A
t+1
Na−1,At+1
. (26)
The clearing conditions for the labor markets and the asset market are standard and given in:
At+1 = Vt+1 +DFt+1 +DGt+1, L
D,i
t = L
S,i
t , ∀i. (27)
The assets invested in the representative firm, assets invested abroad and government bonds have
to sum up to the total asset holdings in the economy.
4.7 Full scale numerical model
The next section will present numerical simulation results using a full scale computational model
that incorporates features which were not described in the simple presentation above. Those
features are of no crucial importance for understanding the main qualitative mechanisms but are
necessary for a quantitative exercise that should capture the main characteristics of the Austrian
pension system and labor market. We will now briefly list the additional features. A detailed
description of the full model without migration is provided by Berger et al. (2009). First, the full
scale model adds one more labor market margin next to participation and hours worked, namely,
unemployment. The probability of finding a job depends on the search effort of workers and the
amount of vacancies created by the firm. Second, productivity θa is endogenous as firms and
individuals can invest in training. Third, on top of the life long training there is an endogenous
initial skill choice. Fourth, to match the observed asset distribution the model incorporates
a warm-glow motive leading to inter-vivo transfers from the older to the younger age groups
within a skill class but separate for natives and foreigners. Fifth, as the pathway to retirement
via the disability pension system is important in Austria, this option is captured by the full scale
model. However, the probability of entitlement to a disability pension is modeled as an exogenous
shock, which implies that the pension reforms we consider exclude adjustments or changes of the
disability pension system. Sixth, the full model additionally captures many institutional details
concerning taxation and subsidization of individuals and firms. Most importantly, we distinguish
between a social security budget paying for pensions, unemployment benefits, disability benefits
and health insurance, financed by social security contributions of employers and employees on
one hand and a general budget on the other hand. The general budget is financed by income,
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consumption and corporate taxes and is used to cover government expenditure, various subsidies
and interest payment for government debt.
5 Scenario simulations
The goal is to quantify the effect of demographic changes and policy on public finances and
economic outcomes over the next decades in Austria. We separate demographic scenarios from
policy reforms. Section 3 presented the main demographic facts and projections for Austria.
In the simulations, we rely on data and scenarios from Statistik Austria for fertility, mortality
and migration evolutions between 2010 and 2075 and consider five demographic scenario: main
scenario, high migration, low migration, high fertility and high skill migration. Themain scenario
takes the main predictions for fertility, mortality and migration flows from Statistik Austria.
The high (respectively, low) migration scenario takes the high (respectively, low) migration flow
predictions from Statistik Austria. The high fertility scenario considers fertility flows which
are midway between the standard and the high fertility scenarios from Statistik Austria. The
resulting increase in fertility is an average of 25%, depending on the age class12. The high skill
migration assumes that 5% (in pp) of low skill migrants to Austria are replaced by 5% (in pp)
of high skill migrants.
Although it is possible to simulate the effect of the same policy reform on different demographic
scenarios, we will present the effect of policy reforms only for the main scenario, in the interest
of space.
Population aging puts pressure on the retirement pension system. Reforms of the pension system
come at strong political costs, if they are implemented at all. Retirement ages are increased,
but rarely as fast as the longevity increases. One of the biggest impacts of population aging
is thus on the financial sustainability of the pension systems. The main outcome variable that
we will consider is thus the social security deficit. Another big impact of aging is changes in
health expenditures, since those are increasing with the age of the ill. We will thus look at the
financing deficit of the entire social security system, comprising retirement pensions, disability
benefits, unemployment insurance and health insurance, and also at the financing deficit of the
sole retirement pensions.
Financing social security, and retirement pensions in particular, is partly done on labor (income
taxes and social security contributions). Reducing social security deficits by increasing revenue
is a dis-incentive to provide labor along several margins. We will thus look at the labor supply
behavioral response of policy reforms, looking at the effective retirement age or participation
margin, the average hours of work by worker and unemployment. Changes in labor supply and
savings decisions affect production too, so we will also consider the per capita effect on GDP.
One can not measure directly the effect of migration on the financing of social security and other
economic outcomes. Indeed, even without migration, population aging prevents the demographic
situation to be in a steady-state. To measure the effect of migration in our equilibrium model,
one thus needs to compare the outcome value of interest along the transition path when there
is a given level migration and when there is another level of migration, as illustrated in figure
5. Alternatively one could compare a given migration scenario with no migration at all. We will
12We have deviated from the Statistik Austria scenario for the following reasons: fertility variations relate
directly to behavior while migration flows depend significantly on policy; a 50% increase in fertility, the high
fertility scenario of Statistik Austria, is a strong shift in behavior unrelated to policy; we focus our analysis on
policy reforms and not on changes in individual preferences.
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compare the medium level migration projections with the high migration scenario from Statistik
Austria, the later having 25% more migration in average.
Figure 5: Idea of effect identification
t = 0 t→∞
outcome X
Xno change
Xaging and high migration
Xaging and migration
effect of additional migration
some
original steady state new steady states
In the next subsection we present the calibration. It is followed by the simulation results for
demographic scenarios. The following subsection presents results for policy reforms. The final
subsection summarizes the main findings of the simulations.
5.1 Calibration
This section describes the calibration of the model for Austria. 2010 was chosen as basis year. As
the calibration of the full scale model is quite involved we mainly focus on the changes that where
made in comparison to Berger et al. (2009), who provide a full documentation of the calibration
procedure. Next to the three skill classes we chose eight age groups, i.e. A = 8, where age group
five is the retirement age group, i.e. ar = 5. Given the distinction between natives and foreigners
this amounts to 48 groups. We normalize the population of age over 15 to 100 in the basis year
which gives the age distribution contained in table 2.
Table 2: Age structure of the Austrian population in 2010
natives foreigners
15 to 19 years 6.32% 0.65%
20 to 24 years 6.27% 1.02%
25 to 39 years 19.33% 4.18%
40 to 54 years 25.19% 2.91%
55 to 69 years 18.08% 1.54%
70 to 79 years 8.53% 0.31%
80 to 84 years 2.98% 0.07%
85 years and more 2.57% 0.05%
89.27% 10.73%
Source: Statistik Austria.
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The definitions of native and foreigner are based on having or not having the Austrian citizenship.
In principle another, more economically relevant criterion would be preferable. As the household
side of the model has to be calibrated using such different individual micro-data sources as
the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC) the citizenship provides a reliable criterion for distinction. For the simulations we use
an assimilation rate of ζ = 0.5, which implies that on average after two generations immigrated
foreigners are indistinguishable from natives. The assimilation rate is therefore interpreted as
a pure economic measure which does not have to coincide with the probability of receiving the
Austrian citizenship. Comparing the age structure of the stock (table 2) with the net inflow
(table 1) of foreigners reveals that immigrants are younger. The skill structure is taken from the
Labour Force Survey as shown in table 3. Low skill is defined as having attained the highest
level of eduction below upper secondary (ISCED 0-2), i.e. individuals without ’Matura’. Medium
skilled individuals have completed upper secondary education (ISCED 3-4), while high skilled
hold an academic degree (ISCED 5-6). The skill distribution of foreigners is more disperse, with
more low- and high- but less medium-skilled. Due to lack of information we impute the current
skill structure for future migrants.
Table 3: Skill structure of the Austrian population in 2010
low medium high
natives 25.50% 60.22% 14.28%
foreigners 36.67% 46.37% 16.96%
Source: Labour Force Survey.
In Berger et al. (2009) the calibration of the model for the households (e.g. age-dependent pro-
ductivity) is done using disaggregated data at the micro level. In this paper the exact same
procedure was simply repeated for the two subpopulations: natives and foreigners. The reader
is referred to Berger et al. (2009) for more details on that part of the calibration. A general
problem using an equilibrium model is that simulations have to start in a steady state, but the
demographic structure from 2010 is not a stationary distribution. For the mortality, migration,
and fertility rates observed in 2010 the stationary distribution would be much more concentrated
at high age groups. The question is how to find an initial equilibrium when aging is an ongoing
process. In principle one has to compromise between two targets. On one hand one can fit the
observed demographic transition rates which will give more realistic individual decision making
but as argued before comes at the cost of implying a equilibrium population which is consid-
erably older than actually observed in 2010. In this case some macro aggregates like pension
expenditures cannot be fit to the data. On the other hand one could target the current popu-
lation structure by adjusting the demographic transition rates, e.g. by increasing the mortality
rates which will allow to fit observed social security expenditures and revenues but will also
lead to wrong household decisions because people would have a too short life cycle. We do not
compromise between those two approaches by making use of proxy-migration to tackle this issue.
This means that we use the observed demographic transition rates and change migration flows in
the calibration period such that we precisely match the actual demographic distribution. As the
probability of migrating does not influence the behavior of the households there is no mistake in
individual decision making. The simulation then starts in 2011 where the system is shocked by
using the actual forecasted migration flows instead of the proxy-migration.
Figure 5 shows the use of different demographic scenarios in our simulation. We take the main
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Statistik Austria scenario, covering changes in mortality, fertility and migration, as our bench-
mark scenario. When simulating a different scenario, say higher migration, we infer the economic
impact from the difference between the high migration and the main scenario.
Statistik Austria publishes yearly forecasts in mortality rates for each age. We aggregate them
accordingly for our age groups, such that within an age group the mortality rate is constant. The
same is done for the age-dependent forecast for fertility rates. These are additionally adjusted
to reproduce the predicted amount of newborns, since the model does not distinguish between
men and women. Due to lack of data we assume that fertility rates do not differ between skill
group and nationality. Statistik Austria only reports forecasts for immigration and emigration.
We assume that those flows have the same nationality, age and skill structure as in 2010 which
allows to produce net migration flows per age-skill-nationality cell. Using this approach the model
can almost perfectly match the forecasted age structure, where the only discrepancy comes from
imprecisions through aggregation into age groups and the fact that age groups are of different
size.
One important difference to Berger et al. (2009) is that health costs are modeled by taking the
age profile into account. Figure 6 reports the age-related public expenditure on health per capita.
Clearly, health expenditure are not equally distributed over the life cycle. We convert the profile
into weights and distribute aggregate health expenditures over the population. Hence, even for
a stable but aging population total health expenditures will increase. This treatment of health
expenditure should be interpreted as a lower bound because we have to assume that the age
profile given in figure 6 is constant over time, due to the lack of reliable long-term forecasts13.
Figure 6: Age-related public expenditure on health per capita in EUR for Austria 2007
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Source: Data from IHS HealthEcon also presented in Czypionka et al. (2011).
The key elasticities for the behavior of the households in the labor market are summarized in
table 4. Here we do not distinguish between nationalities nor age. However, we match the actual
hours worked and participation per group by adjusting the age- and nationality-dependent shift
parameter in the disutility cost functions ϕ (·).
13Czypionka et al. (2011) show that the age profile for health costs has not been stable over the last couple of
years and tends to increase, especially for the old age groups.
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Table 4: Summary of used labor market elasticities
low skill medium skill high skill
elasticities of
- hours worked 0.100 0.090 0.080
- retirement 0.108 0.090 0.050
- participation 0.092 0.085 0.050
A key difference in the labor market outcomes between foreigners and natives is labor income.
Table 5 shows a summary of the labor income profiles conditional on participation and employ-
ment. The pattern is as expected as income profiles increase in age and skill. Given the observed
hours worked one can compute the underlying group-specific productivity parameters θa,i,n.
Table 5: Summary of labor income profiles conditional on participation and employment
natives foreigners
low medium high low medium high
15 to 19 years 1.000 - - 0.865 - -
20 to 24 years 1.110 1.533 - 1.110 1.365 -
25 to 39 years 1.240 1.725 2.525 1.240 1.486 2.457
40 to 54 years 1.409 2.071 3.214 1.409 1.772 2.956
55 to 69 years 1.347 2.036 3.293 1.254 1.606 3.433
Notes: Empty cells indicate the assumption of non-participation during education.
Profiles were normalized using young, low-skilled natives.
Source: Data from EU-SILC for 2010 and own calculations.
Table 3 showed the skill structure of the stock of natives and foreigners in the steady state.
We additionally have to make assumptions about the skill distribution of newborns. As net
migration flows of natives are small, they hardly have an effect on the distribution of the stock of
natives. For foreigners this is not the case. To capture the idea of persistence in the foreigners’
skill distribution through inter-generational skill spillovers we use the following skill transition
probabilities in order to calibrate ϕi,jA .
Table 6: Skill transition probabilities for foreigners
offspring
low skill medium skill high skill
low skill 0.610 0.350 0.040
parents medium skill 0.112 0.709 0.179
high skill 0.020 0.420 0.560
Source: Own calculations based on data provided in Felderer et al. (2004).
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5.2 Demographic scenarios simulation results
Table 7 presents the results for the main demographic scenario, without any policy reforms, at
four points in time. We describe and comment the results in details for this scenario. For other
scenarios, we will only point to the main differences.
Table 7: Simulation results of the main scenario (001)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.16 33.85 41.86 42.81
Effective retirement age 58.80 58.93 59.14 59.04
Unemployment rate 5.90 5.98 6.32 6.63
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1583 1573 1565
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 815 766 662 642
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.56 -1.41 -2.98
Net wages - -0.51 -1.14 -2.53
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.42 -7.94 -11.26
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.91 -17.74 -21.59
Capital/capita - -6.33 -20.00 -24.24
Consumption/capita - -7.91 -16.49 -20.71
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.53 18.88 22.94 22.89
Social security deficit 6.82 9.32 16.57 17.47
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.82 8.91 14.69 15.50
Pension deficit 4.57 6.08 10.89 11.36
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.57 5.81 9.66 10.08
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.65 0.48 0.46
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.91 0.69 0.62
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
The population increases by close to 13% in 2050, the share of foreigners reaching 30%14 in 2070.
Population aging is reflected by the dependency ratio, which more than doubles between 2011
and 2070. In 2070, the ratio is higher than 50%, meaning that approximately more than half of
the output (income) generated by one worker is used to finance consumption of persons in age
of retirement. Even if there are no policy reforms, the current fiscal and pension systems have a
(mild) component to stimulates later entry into retirement. The average effective retirement age
increases slightly from 58.8 to above 59. Even though taxes are kept constant, population aging
puts pressure on the financing of the pension system and the average pension per beneficiary
loses 7.9% (in detrended value, that is compared to what the value would be if it had followed
the productivity growth rhythm). There is thus less incentive to work and accumulate pension
rights over the entire life-cycle and effective employment per worker slightly decreases over time,
from an average of 1587 hours per year per worker to 1565 in 2070. The decrease in effective
14Recall that this number is not necessarily related to the number of non-Austrian citizens.
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employment is more visible when one looks at the effective hours per capita, which decrease by
more than 20%. This is due to the increase in life expectancy (moving from about 80.3 to 87.7
years for newborns), being significantly larger than the increase in retirement age. It is thus no
surprise that the GDP per capita loses more than 21% (in detrended value) by 2070.
Population aging and migration have significant impacts on the labor market. Combining all
margins together, the average working time per capita decline from 815 to 642 yearly hours. The
main driver is the combination of aging and retirement decisions.
The decline along the intensive margin (hours per worker) is limited, moving from 1587 to
1565 yearly hours. The overall participation rate among workers of ages 15 to 69 declines from
63.8% to 61.0% (not reported), another relatively moderate decline. The constant inflow of new
immigrants increases labor supply but the sluggish response of firms, due to capital adjustment
costs, creates a wedge between labor demand and labor supply and raises the unemployment
rate. The increase in the unemployment rate from 5.9% to 6.3% thus also contributes to the
decline in effective labor supply, but in moderate proportion. Most of the decline however comes
from retirement and aging. Intertemporal optimization decisions from households, who balance
disutility of labor with added consumption, lead them to delay retirement, without any reform.
However, the increase is small: the effective retirement age climbs from 58.8 years to 59.0 years.
This decision is partly due to the loss of pensions (-7.9%) relative to productivity growth, which
increases the attractiveness of leisure. The pension loss itself is driven by three factors. First, the
partial indexation of benefits over the entire-life cycle is only 30% of the wage growth15. Hence,
pensions decrease in comparison to wages during retirement. As people live longer, pensions on
average decrease. Second, pensions are lower because the average wage rate is driven down by
the labor supply shock of immigration. Third, there is a composition effect, given the rising
share of foreigners, who have worse labor market perspectives and consequently lower pensions.
Obviously, this composition effect has no direct effect on the retirement decision. Over this
period, life expectancy increases from 80.3 to 87.7 years. Clearly the low increase in retirement
age and large increase in life expectancy has a large impact on overall labor supply, as is reflected
in the fraction of pensioners in society, increasing from 29% to 43%.
Migration influences education decisions of the native population. Table 8 shows that natives
choose to replace high level with medium level education over time. In spite of this decision, the
proportion of households with medium level education in the entire population declines. This is
driven by immigration, labor demand and net wages variations. Most migrants to Austria have
either low or high skills, compared to the natives. This unbalanced increase in labor supply forces
firms to offer higher wages to medium skill workers, in order to attract more of them and maintain
a production plan with an optimal balance of workers across the skill distribution. The higher
increase in wage for medium skill positions tilts natives education decisions towards medium
level education. Natives are responding to the inflows of migrants by choosing educations which
compensate the relative imbalance in the skill distribution of migrants16.
The simulation also quantifies the magnitude of the challenge posed by population aging on social
security financing. At constant population, the social security deficit without any reforms would
rise from the current 6.8% to 15.5% of GDP in 2070, a more than two-folds increase. Focusing
on the retirement pension component of social insurances, the deficit rises from 4.6% to 9.7% in
15Numerical simulations with twice larger indexation, not reported here, show that the relative loss of pension
benefits is reduced to 5.40%.
16Simulations assuming exogenous and constant skill decisions by natives confirm that natives decisions are
driven by changes in relative marginal product of labor and wages. For instance, net wage changes of natives in
2050 would be -2.8% for low skills, +3.2% for medium skills and -5.7% for high skills. Allowing for endogenous
education clearly would push for less high level education.
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Table 8: Skill distribution and net wages changes in the main demographic scenario
Skill Overall Natives Foreigners
distribution 2011 2050 2011 2050 2011 2050
Low 26.7% 27.9% 25.5% 25.5% 36.7% 35.4%
Medium 58.7% 57.7% 60.2% 61.0% 46.4% 47.3%
High 14.6% 14.4% 14.3% 13.4% 17.0% 17.3%
Net wages Overall Natives Foreigners
variations 2011/2050 2011/2050 2011/2050
Low -3.5% -3.1% -4.0%
Medium -0.5% 1.1% -0.9%
High 0.4% 0.4% -2.7%
2050 and 10.1% of GDP in 2070, consistent with the 10.1% deficit estimate in 2050 from Jaag
et al. (2010). The financing deficit increase both for the entire social security insurance and the
sole retirement pension systems. The numbers illustrate the effect of population aging not only
on the financing of retirement pensions, but also on financing health insurances17. As population
ages, the fraction of health expenditures out of total output increases fastest (40% increase in
2070, as opposed to 12% for population and 30% for pension expenditures), since health costs
increase with the age of ill households. A first policy implication and a contribution to the
literature of this research project is that reforms need to tackle not only retirement pensions,
but also health insurance financing to deal with an aging population.
Table 7 also shows that immigration helps but does not solve the social security financing issues.
The social security ratio of natives is lower than that of foreigners, indicating that natives draw
more out of the social security system than they contribute directly (not taking taxes into
account), and even more so than the foreigners. The ratio is also below one for foreigners which
means that they also draw more than they contribute. Overall, the average deficit ratio is
however higher and more favorable with foreigners. Looking at changes over time, one sees that
they decrease for both subpopulations. Aging does not only affect the native population, but
also that with foreign background. For instance, the ratio decreases from 0.72 in 2011 to 0.46 in
2070 for natives, and from 0.94 to 0.62 for foreigners. Figure 7 provides a graphical illustration
of this analysis, comparing the age structures of each subpopulation in 2011 and in 2070. The
fact that foreigners draw less from the social security system in net can be seen from the larger
fraction of employed households (blue colored) out of the total population.
17Budget balancing rules have an influence on the results, which underestimate the challenge in a more realistic
setting. We will come back to this point below.
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Figure 7: Demographic structure and labor market outcomes in Austria in 2011 and 2070
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Note: Left panel shows 2011, the right panel shows 2070. Numbers are reported in percent of the population of
15+ year old in 2010. Source: Statistik Austria and simulation results.
Table 9 presents the simulation results for the high-migration scenario, still without policy reform.
Table 9: Simulation results of the high migration scenario (020)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 105.69 118.78 121.94
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.75 27.22 34.21
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.01 48.64 50.86
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.16 33.57 40.92 41.78
Effective retirement age 58.80 58.92 59.13 59.11
Unemployment rate 5.90 6.00 6.42 6.58
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1582 1570 1562
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 815 768 669 652
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.81 -2.16 -2.26
Net wages - -0.73 -1.79 -1.73
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.47 -8.81 -12.53
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.81 -17.45 -20.23
Capital/capita - -6.36 -19.90 -22.35
Consumption/capita - -7.01 -15.55 -17.95
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.92 11.40 11.89
Pension expenditure 17.53 18.89 23.34 23.75
Social security deficit 6.82 9.21 16.48 17.40
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.82 8.71 13.87 14.27
Pension deficit 4.57 5.97 10.64 11.05
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.57 5.65 8.96 9.06
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.65 0.49 0.48
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.94 0.73 0.65
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
Not surprisingly, the size of the population is larger than in the main scenario, increasing by
almost 22% in 2070 compared to less than 13%. The share of foreigners is also larger. Since
migrants arrive at a relative young age, the dependency ratio is lower, at 50.8% rather than
26
52.8%. This should translates into lower pension and social security deficits. It is indeed the
case: in constant population terms, the deficits in 2070 are 9% and 14.3% of GDP in the high
migration case, compared to 10% and 15.5% in the main scenario. Some might have expected a
larger effect of migration on deficit reduction. The reason for a moderate effect is that migrants
also age and rely on retirement pensions.
One can also note that the loss of GDP per capita (compared to the productivity growth trend)
is lower in the high migration scenario, at 20.2% versus 21.6%. This outcome is driven by
labor supply effects, as the participation rate in the high migration case is higher (44.6% versus
43.9%, which translates into a 652 work hours per capita versus 642). One explanation for this
difference is that immigrants are younger in relative terms so the average dependency ratio is
lower, meaning that there are more people in working age.
We compared the effect of higher migration with standard retirement policy reforms. Specifically,
we simulated the effect of an increase in retirement age under the main demographic scenario so
that the social security deficit (in constant population terms) is equivalent to the deficit in the
high migration scenario, that is 13.87% of GDP in 2050. We did the same experiment separately
of reducing pension benefits and increasing social security contributions. The result is as follows:
an increase in migration flows into Austria (of about 25%) leads to the same deficit reduction by
2050 as an effective increase of retirement of 1 year, or an average decrease of retirement pensions
of 11.3% (rather than the 7.9% due to population aging), or an average increase of social security
contributions of 6.7%. These experiments show that the effect of migration, although not large,
can not be considered small either. Details on these experiments are included in subsection 5.3.
Table 10 presents the results for the low migration scenario without policy reforms. Results are
symmetric to the high migration scenario.
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Table 10: Simulation results of the low migration scenario (103)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 103.69 106.83 103.45
Share of foreigners 10.73 13.42 21.31 26.76
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.78 52.79 55.23
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.16 34.13 42.90 43.75
Effective retirement age 58.80 58.93 59.17 59.15
Unemployment rate 5.90 5.95 6.16 6.34
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1583 1576 1572
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 815 764 655 639
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.31 -0.39 -1.11
Net wages - -0.28 -0.22 -0.80
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.38 -7.02 -9.71
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.98 -17.87 -20.71
Capital/capita - -6.31 -19.85 -22.49
Consumption/capita - -8.51 -16.36 -19.24
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.83 10.54 10.37
Pension expenditure 17.53 18.87 22.54 21.92
Social security deficit 6.82 9.44 16.64 16.83
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.82 9.10 15.57 16.27
Pension deficit 4.57 6.19 11.12 11.18
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.57 5.97 10.41 10.80
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.64 0.48 0.46
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.88 0.65 0.60
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
Table 11 contains the results of the simulation for the high fertility scenario. The positive
impact of higher fertility takes time to materialize: the dependency ratio improves to 49.9%
in 2070 (compared to 52.8% in the base demographic scenario) but the difference is smaller in
2050 (49.2% versus 50.6%). Consequently, the improvement in financing of social insurances
are largest by 2070. Then, the pension deficit in constant population terms goes down from
10.1% for the base scenario to 8.5% under high fertility. The reason for such an improvement is
mechanical, in the sense that higher fertility compensates for the increase in life expectancy and
reduce the speed of population aging18.
18A simulation of even higher fertility, taking 100% of the high fertility scenario from Statistik Austria instead
of 50%, leads to similar results for the given time horizon. For instance, in 2070, the pension deficit (in constant
population) is 8.31% instead of 8.45%. Benefits are larger for longer time horizons.
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Table 11: Simulation results of the high fertility scenario (022)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 114.99 118.42
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.17 29.90
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 49.20 49.89
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.16 33.85 41.09 40.90
Effective retirement age 58.80 58.93 59.16 59.35
Unemployment rate 5.90 5.97 6.31 5.99
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1583 1571 1552
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 815 766 665 661
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.54 -1.57 1.57
Net wages - -0.48 -1.27 1.95
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.42 -7.93 -11.40
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.81 -17.48 -17.27
Capital/capita - -6.30 -19.73 -17.04
Consumption/capita - -6.89 -14.62 -12.07
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 11.11 11.51
Pension expenditure 17.53 18.88 22.96 22.94
Social security deficit 6.82 9.32 16.38 15.78
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.82 8.90 14.24 13.33
Pension deficit 4.57 6.08 10.67 10.00
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.57 5.80 9.28 8.45
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.65 0.49 0.52
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.91 0.70 0.66
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
Table 12 presents the result for the high skill migration scenario with no policy reform. Compared
to the main migration scenario, the effects are almost identical. GDP per capita indeed grows
more but the 2070 social security deficit is only reduced from 15.5% to 15.4%. Higher skill
migration increases the average productivity. As expected, the GDP per capita deviation from
trend is lower than in the main case (-17.3% instead of -21.6% in 2050). However, high skill
workers in general receive higher pension benefits, as these are tied to the earnings history. This
explains why the social security deficit is not reduced much. Izquierdo et al. (2010) also finds a
low impact of skill content on public finances in Spain. On the other hand, Storesletten (2000)
finds strong impacts of the skill content of migration in the US. The difference in results may be
due to the fact that social security benefits in the US are regressive, so less pensions need to be
paid to high skill migrants.
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Table 12: Simulation results of the high skill migration scenario (025)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.16 33.83 41.80 42.72
Effective retirement age 58.80 58.94 59.19 59.11
Unemployment rate 5.90 5.95 6.23 6.50
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1583 1574 1565
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 815 766 665 646
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.50 -1.10 -2.46
Net wages - -0.44 -0.79 -1.97
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.37 -7.67 -10.78
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.71 -17.02 -20.61
Capital/capita - -6.01 -18.89 -22.80
Consumption/capita - -7.64 -15.77 -19.64
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.53 18.88 22.98 22.96
Social security deficit 6.82 9.30 16.49 17.37
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.82 8.89 14.62 15.41
Pension deficit 4.57 6.07 10.85 11.32
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.57 5.80 9.62 10.05
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.65 0.48 0.46
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.92 0.71 0.63
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
5.3 Policy reforms scenario
An overview of the simulation results of a selection of policy reforms can be found in table 13.
Complete results by policy can be found in appendix A. For comparison purposes, we include
the simulation results of the demographic scenarios as well as the initial steady-state values (in
2010).
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Table 13: Overview of selected simulation results (year 2050)
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The table shows that the only policy reforms which are successful in containing the social security
deficit are 8 years increases in effective retirement age or a combination of medium to strong
reduction in public pensions, increase in contributions and effective retirement age. The pension
reduction is an ex-ante reduction of benefits corresponding to an aggregate reduction of 3% of
GDP, leading ex-post to an average of almost 25% reduction in pension payments compared to
the productivity growth trend. The increase in contributions is an ex-ante increase amounting to
3% of GDP, leading to an ex-post average increase higher than 15%. The increase in retirement
age is an ex-ante increase of 3 years phased-in over 40 years, with an ex-post effective increase
of 2.5 years19. This combined reform (055) would lead to a pension deficit cut from 4.5 to 2.5%
of GDP (in constant population) and total social security benefits essentially kept constant at
6.8%. An increase in 8 years of effective retirement age (207) would achieve the same deficit
reduction but also increase output beyond productivity trend.
Other policy reforms from this selection which are successful at containing the pension deficit are
either not successful at containing the total social security benefits (011; strong pension benefit
reduction) or adjust social security contributions at every period (044, 045; more on these below).
All of the policy reforms presented in the table have the intended effect of reducing social security
deficit. Some policies however impose a higher penalty on economic growth. From those policies
which achieve the same social security deficit target as higher migration (150, 151, 152), an
increase in contributions leads to a loss of 18.6% of GDP per capita growth (compared to the
productivity growth level) while an increase in the effective retirement age leads to a loss of
less than 14.5% of GDP. Lower pension benefits lead to an intermediate value. This is a general
pattern: amongst single instrument policy variations, higher contributions are the most damaging
to economic growth and later retirement age the least.
The phased-in 4.3 years increase of the retirement age over 40 years corresponds approximately
to a 2/3 rule of life (reform 203): for every increase in life expectancy of 1 year, the retirement
age should increase by 0.66 year, taking a work life of 40 years and a rough average retirement
life of 20 years; under the main demographic scenario, life expectancy increases from about 81
to about 88 years; the 7 years life expectancy increase is associated with a gradual increase of
4.7 years in the retirement age, comparable to 4.3. The simulation shows that the 2/3 rule of
thumb is roughly successful at containing the pension deficit, but not the total social security
deficit, due to health expenditure increases.
If one wanted to devise a rule of thumb to contain total social security deficit, one would need to
increase retirement age by more, namely an effective increase of 7.8 years (case 207). This would
correspond to a 8/7 rule of thumb, another illustration of the impact of population aging when
health expenditures are age-dependent. Yet another illustration of the importance of these costs is
the estimation of public finance deficit assuming that health expenditures are not age-dependent
(case 301), a counterfactual experiment. By 2050, the total social security deficit would reach
12.80% of GDP, a difference of close to 2% of GDP with the more realistic assumption of age-
dependent expenditures (main scenario). The bias in estimating social security deficit increases,
introduced by assuming flat health expenditures, is thus close to 25%, a significant number20.
Retirement pensions can be reformed with other instruments. Indexing pension benefits fully
on inflation rather than partially on wages (reform 003) yields similar results as a light pension
19Ex-ante refers to ceteris paribus changes, before taking behavioral responses into account, which we refer to
as ex-post.
20As immigrants are younger in average and health expenditures increase with age, one would expect that higher
immigration increase even more the bias. Numerical simulation (not reported here) confirm this expectation, but
to a very small extent.
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benefit reduction (reform 150). Higher penalties for early retirement (reform 007) or a higher
reference year for the calculation of rights in the pension corridor (reform 013) have similar effects
as a direct increase in the retirement age (reform 152), with different magnitudes.
Simulating the impact of higher productivity growth (reform 024) illustrates how critical the
overall health of the economy is. Without any reform, an increase of 50% of the growth rate
would have a larger pension deficit reduction effect than a 2.5 years effective increase in the
retirement age (reform 019).
The last group of simulations in table 13 evaluates the impact of more realistic modeling fea-
tures, rarely found in previous analyses of the role of population aging and migration. The main
novelties of the model are age-dependent health expenditures, endogenous retirement decisions
and endogenous human capital formation. We discussed the bias created by taking age-invariant
health expenditures above. Simulations show that exogenous and constant human capital dis-
tribution leads to similar predictions of public finance deficits and other aggregate outcomes.
Subsection 5.2 however discussed skill composition effects and hinted at different distributional
consequences when one considers exogenous or endogenous education decisions.
There is also a bias when considering exogenous retirement decisions. The magnitude of the bias
depends on which approach is used to assess the role of migration. The literature has quantified
the effect of immigration on public finances in essentially two ways, either by evaluating what
reforms would be needed to achieve the same deficit reduction as a given immigration increase
or by direct simulation and projection of the deficit. We provide simulation results for both
approaches. Storesletten (2000) uses the first approach and finds that a 40% increase in high
skill migration would lead to the same reduction as an increase of 16% in income taxes. Our
simulations show that the high migration scenario of Statistik Austria would deliver the same
deficit reduction as an average additional cut of pension benefits of 3.3% (11.2% loss in case 160
rather than 8% in case 001). If one assumes exogenous retirement decisions, the deficit reduction
would correspond to an additional cut of pension benefits of 3.8% (12.2% loss in case 355 rather
than 8.4% loss in case 351). The 3.8% versus 3.3% bias of using constant retirement age is
significant. Exogenous retirement decisions thus overestimate the benefit of immigration.
The bias is also large when evaluating the effect of reforms under demographic changes. A
moderate to large reduction in pension benefits would move social security deficit in 2050 from
14.7% to 10.7% of GDP under endogenous retirement decisions, a 50% lower increase of deficit
from 2010 to 2050 (cases 001 versus 160). The same reduction in pension benefits under exogenous
decisions would move deficits from 15.0% to 11.3%, a 45% lower increase of deficit (cases 350
versus 352). Exogenous retirement decision thus underestimate the benefit of pension reduction,
predicting a 45% gain while the gain is 50% with endogenous retirement decisions. The reason is
that intertemporal optimization retirement decisions, balancing disutility of delayed retirement
with loss in purchasing power due to lower pensions, lead households to delay retirement, an
additional benefit to pension cuts when it comes to pension financing. Endogenous retirement
decisions are thus important when one evaluates the effect of reforms and demographic changes
on social security financing, whether these changes involve migration or not.
One critical choice of the simulations is the policy instrument to close the government budget.
In the simulation, lump-sum taxes are changed in every period so that the government debt is
kept constant (in detrended terms), covering possible deficits from the social security budget.
Alternative choices could be labor income taxes or social security contributions. One can also
decide to balance the social security budget and the overall government budget with different
instruments. In this case, the social security deficit is kept constant with one instrument (say
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social security contributions) and the overall government budget is kept constant with another
instrument (say lump-sum taxes).
The reason for choosing lump-sum taxes for closing the overall government budget is that we want
to isolate the effects of population aging and migration. Using social security contributions or
income taxes modifies the labor supply behavior of households, so a closing instrument different
than lump-sum taxes would superimpose tax distortion effects to demographic effects. On the
other hand, closing the budget with lump-sum taxes carries a significant cost. The approach
underestimates the pragmatic effect of demographic changes. Indeed, using lump-sum taxes for
revenue generation is unrealistic and government use them primarily as redistribution schemes,
for instance for family subsidies. Government therefore rely on other taxes and contributions to
raise revenue in reality.
To quantify the extent of the pragmatic underestimation which comes with choosing lump-sum
taxes, we have run simulation with more realistic budget closing instruments. Table 14 presents
the result of balancing at every period the social security budget with contributions so that it
remains constant, without any additional policy reform. While the deficit is constant at 6.8% (in
actual population terms; 6.0% in 2050 in constant population terms), social security contributions
doubles, decreasing labor supply incentives. For instance, the working hours per capita reduce
to 557 in 2050, compared to 662 when lump-sum taxes are used (see table 7). As a consequence,
detrended GDP per capita is reduced by more than 30% when closing with contributions as
opposed to less than 20% when closing with lump-sum taxes. One should keep in mind this gap
for policy advice when using the policy reforms comparison in table 13.
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Table 14: Simulation results of the main scenario with budget closing SSC (044)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.21 34.82 45.01 44.97
Effective retirement age 58.76 58.26 56.91 57.48
Unemployment rate 5.97 6.81 9.84 10.00
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1589 1577 1541 1528
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 814 735 557 552
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - 0.29 2.07 0.09
Net wages - -7.45 -26.27 -26.64
Social security contribution - 26.25 102.81 98.90
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.37 -12.87 -19.99
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -9.17 -31.05 -32.77
Capital/capita - -10.00 -32.74 -35.00
Consumption/capita - -15.06 -28.66 -32.41
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.56 19.43 23.39 21.69
Social security deficit 6.79 6.79 6.79 6.79
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.79 6.49 6.02 6.03
Pension deficit 4.55 4.55 4.48 3.81
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.55 4.35 3.97 3.38
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.74
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 1.04 1.08 0.97
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
5.4 Comparison with literature results
We compare our results with similar exercises in the literature.
Storesletten (2000) compares reforms that are needed to maintain the sustainability of social
security in the US, taking into account population aging and current migration flows. He finds
that a 40% increase in highest skill migration (high skill adults aged 40-44) would lead to the
same result as an increase of 16% in income taxes (from 0.282 to 0.326), both reforms delivering
sustainability. We find that with our main migration scenario, social security contributions need
to increase 103% between 2010 and 2050 to maintain total social security deficit constant (case
44), while the increase is only 94% for the high migration scenario, which corresponds to 25%
more migration that in the main scenario and 8% lower contributions (case 45). In spite of the
differences of the analysis (Austria; average skill migration; endogenous retirement decision), the
similarity of the quantitative results is remarkable.
Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlifoff (2003) and Borgy, Chojnicki, Le Garrec and Schwellnus (2009) use
general equilibrium models with several regions of the world and population aging. The first
paper uses exogenous migration flows, endogenous intensive labor supply decisions and exoge-
nous retirement dates. The second analysis uses endogenous migration flows and exogenous
labor supply decisions. They both compare the change in tax (and social security contributions)
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rates which are necessary to keep the government budget balanced. Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlifoff
(2003) find that total rates in Europe should increase from 0.40 to 0.69 between 2000 and 2050
with current immigrations while they only need to increase to 0.66 with doubling immigration,
respective increases of 71% and 64%. In other words, an increase of 100% of immigration would
lead to a public finance gain of about 10% (elasticity: 0.1). Borgy, Chojnicki, Le Garrec and
Schwellnus (2009) compare United Nations exogenous migration flows projections and endoge-
nous flows, which turn out to be 170% larger. Contributions increases from 0.17 to 0.28 under
exogenous flows and to 0.255 with endogenous migration flows, respective increases of 64% and
50%. In other words, an increase of 170% of immigration would lead to a public finance gain of
about 23% (elasticity: 0.14). In comparison, we find that an increase of 25% of migration leads
to gain of about 8% in public finance (elasticity: 0.32). One explanation for the larger elasticity
that we find are age-dependent health expenditures, which magnifies the impact of population
aging on the financing of total security insurances in our analysis. Since immigrants are younger
in average, more immigration does not only help reduce the dependency ratio but also reduces
the impact of aging on health expenditures and thus social security finances. Overall however,
estimates are close.
In their general equilibrium analysis of immigration and population aging in Spain, Izquierdo,
Jimeno and Rojas (2010) focus on skill differences between immigrants and natives. They find
that the pension deficit would rise from 0% in 2000 to 15% of GDP by 2050 with no immigration
and to 5% with current immigration projections, whatever the skill composition of the flows. We
find that the deficit would be 1% higher if migration was only 50% less than the main scenario
projections (pension deficit of 10.7% of GDP instead of 9.7%) and that skill composition of
migration has a small effect (case 025). Impacts of migration found by Izquierdo, Jimeno and
Rojas (2010) are thus larger than the impacts that we find and even larger than the one found
by Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlifoff (2003) and Borgy, Chojnicki, Le Garrec and Schwellnus (2009).
One possible explanation is that there was a large increase in immigration flows in Spain in the
early 2000s, at around the time of the 0% deficit benchmark in 2000.
The goals of the analysis performed by Mayr (2005) are the closest to ours but the tools are
different. Using a generational accounting approach, she finds that an increase of around 40%
of migration would reduce the intertemporal public liabilities (IPL) from 167.5 % to 163.8 % of
GDP, a 2.2% decrease. This aggregate level estimate takes into account demographic changes
but not age-dependent social security expenditures so we compare it with variations in pension
deficit at actual population size (not constant population size, which is a per capita measure).
In our main demographic scenario pension deficit rises to 10.9 % of GDP in 2050 while 25%
more migration would lead to a deficit of 10.6% and 50% more migration to a deficit of 10.5%,
respective drops of 2.2% and 3.0%. Neglecting the fact that a dynamic indicator (IPL) can not
be compared to a static indicator (deficit in % of GDP) in the two studies a 40% increase in
migration leads to improvements of social security financing in the regions of 2.2 to 2.5%, another
remarkable result.
Although Jagg, Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2010) do not evaluate separately the impact of
migration, their general equilibrium analysis of the effect of population aging in Austria is an
interesting benchmark. Their analysis indeed contains similar endogenous labor supply decision
margins, including hours and retirement. Under their base scenario analysis, population would
increase 10% between 2010 and 2050, the fraction of pensioners in the population would increase
by 53%, GDP per capita would be 18.4% lower than the productivity growth trend and the
pension deficit would reach 10.1% of GDP. The pension reform that they consider has several
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components and would encourage later retirement so that the fraction of pensioners would only
represent a 46% increase and the pension deficit would decrease to 8.0% of GDP. Under our
main demographic scenario, we find that population would increase 13% between 2010 and 2050,
the fraction of pensioners would increase by 44%, GDP per capita would be 17.8% lower and
the pension deficit would reach 10.9% of GDP. Our combined pension reform (054) considers
different policy margins but would also achieve a reduction of the pension deficit to 8.5% of GDP
and would encourage later retirement so that the fraction of pensioners only increases by 39%.
Overall again, results are close.
The other general equilibrium analysis of migration, aging and public finance mentioned in section
2 can not be compared with our simulations. Indeed, they either have no quantitative analysis
or contain numerical simulations which are not calibrated and serve as illustrations.
In spite of the differences in model characteristics and datasets, our simulation results are com-
parable to results found previously in the literature. Sometimes, similarities are striking.
5.5 Main findings from the simulations
The first main overall finding of the simulations is that the effect of aging on the social security
finances is different if health insurances are taken into account or not. In the main demographic
scenario, the overall social security deficit rises from 6.8% in 2010 to 14.7% of GDP in 2050, while
the retirement pension deficit alone rises from 4.5% to 9.7% of GDP. The difference comes from
the financing of health expenditures, which increase from 8% to 11% of GDP over the same period.
Accurate modeling of health expenditures variation is still an active area of scientific research
and our simulations also show its importance: unrealistic modeling with health expenditures
that are constant over the life-cycle (as opposed to age-dependent) would underestimate by close
to 25% the increase in deficit due to demographic changes.
The second main overall finding is that migration helps to reduce the social security deficit in a
moderate fashion, without completely reducing it. Higher migration (about 25% larger than the
main scenario) would improve the dependency ratio in 2050 from 50.6% to 48.6% but migrants
also age. As a result, the total social security deficit would only be reduced to 13.9% of GDP
in 2050. To attain a similar social security deficit without additional migration, the effective
retirement age would have to be raised by 1 year, average social security contributions increased
by 6.7% or average pension benefits reduced by 11.2% (rather than the mechanical decrease of
7.9%).
The third main finding is methodological. Taking constant retirement age introduces a bias in
evaluating migration and pension reform effects. For instance, the average pension benefits would
have to be cut by 12.2% to reach the same deficit reduction as higher immigration under constant
retirement age, overestimating its benefits. Constant retirement age would also underestimate
the benefit of pension reductions, predicting a 45% gain instead of a 50% gain under endogenous
retirement decisions.
Other findings include the large financial burden of population aging if no reforms are imple-
mented, the need for moderate to strong multiple pension reforms to maintain social security
financing, the lower damage to economic growth of increases in the retirement age, the efficiency
of a simple 2/3 retirement age increase rule-of-thumb for pension financing but not for total
social security financing , the importance of overall economic health and natives adjustments in
education decisions.
Without any reforms and taking the standard fertility, longevity and migration scenarios from
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Statistik Austria, our simulations show that the social security deficit would more than double
between 2010 and 2050, rising from 6.8% to 14.7% of GDP. Because of the life expectancy
mechanical effect and behavioral responses, the decline in labor supply due to population aging
leads to a GDP per capita which is 18% lower than what it would be if it grew at the speed
of productivity. To isolate the effect of demographic changes, simulations were performed using
lump-sum taxes to close the government budget. In reality, such instruments are not available
and distortive taxes and social contributions would lead to a higher drag on the economy.
Combined moderate to strong increases in the effective retirement age, reductions in pension
benefits and increases in social security contributions would be needed to keep the social security
deficit constant by 2050. If the retirement age is increased by an effective 2.5 years over 40 years,
pension benefits reduced on average by almost 25% and social security contributions increased
on average by 15%, total social security deficit in 2050 would remain at is 2010 level.
Modest single instrument reforms investigated would not be able to contain the social security
deficit. Even a 4 year effective increase phased in over 40 years would lead to an increase in both
pension deficit (almost 6% of GDP in 2050) and in social security deficit (above 10% of GDP).
A gradual increase of 8 years in effective retirement age would be necessary, essentially matching
the increase in life expectancy. From the single instrument reforms, increases in retirement age
are the least damaging to economic growth. Among comparable reforms, GDP per capita in
2050 would be reduced to 14.5% with a 1 year increase in retirement age, 17.5% with a 11%
pension reduction and almost 19% with a 7% social security contribution increase.
A 2/3 rule of thumb for retirement age increase would be successful in containing pension fi-
nancing, but not overall social security financing. If the retirement age is increased in a gradual
fashion by 2 years for every 3 years of life expectancy gained, pension deficit would be (almost)
constant but, once including health insurance, total security deficit would increase from less than
7% to over 10% of GDP. To maintain this deficit constant, a more appropriate rule-of-thumb
would be 8/7.
Natives adjust their education decisions to compensate for the relative imbalance in the immi-
grant skill distribution. As migrants have more low and high skills relative to the natives, natives
shift education decisions from high to medium levels, responding to variations in marginal prod-
uct of labor and wages.
Simulations of the effect of a higher productivity growth illustrate how critical the overall health
of the economy is. A 50% higher growth rate would have the same pension deficit reduction
effect as an effective increase of 2.5 years of retirement.
6 Conclusion
Taking into account households retirement decisions and age-related health costs is important to
measure the impact of population aging and migration on pension and social security financing.
It is even more important when evaluating the effect of pension reforms. Previous analyses of
migration allow for endogenous labor supply decisions along the intensive margin (hours) but
not extensive margins (retirement). This study uses for the first time a general equilibrium
overlapping generation model with endogenous labor supply along both margins and age-related
health costs to quantify the contribution of migration in social security financing and the effect
of pension reforms in Austria.
The two main findings of the numerical simulations are that health expenditures make a sig-
nificant difference in social security financing when population ages and that migrants, who are
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younger on average, help but do not solve the challenge of social security financing. Under the
main demographic scenario, pension deficit alone would rise to 9.7% of GDP by 2050, while the
total social security deficit would rise to 14.7% of GDP. An increase of 25% of migration would
reduce the total security deficit to 13.9% of GDP. Another finding is the importance of model-
ing retirement decisions endogenously, as a constant retirement age overestimates the benefit of
migration and bias the evaluation of pension reforms. Section 5.5 contains more on these and
other findings.
From a policy perspective, relying on immigration to deal with an aging population and finance
retirement is significantly insufficient. Pension reforms are unavoidable and the right balance
needs to be found between participation into the future prosperity brought by productivity
growth and appetite for leisure.
The analysis carried in this study could be extended in two ways. First, the model used a
conservative approach to model the changes in health care costs. We assumed that age-related
expenditures were stable over time. Yet, they could change in two dimensions: the concentration
of expenditures among the old could further increase, a trend documented in past data but
difficult to predict for the future; the share of output dedicated to health services could increase.
In the current analysis, we have assumed that health expenditures were stable along these two
dimensions.
Second, compared to other European countries, Austria has taken less active immigration mea-
sures and with a high proportion of low- and high-skill immigration (Krause and Liebig (2011)).
From an Austrian policy design point of view, it could be interesting to extend the analysis to
assess the impact of more active immigration policies. For instance, a cost and benefit analysis
could be performed for costly education measures to increase the labor market integration of for-
eigners, reduce the productivity penalty imposed by the labor market and increase the education
level of the children of these overrepresented low-skill immigrants.
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A Simulation results details
Table 15: Simulation results of higher productivity growth (2.25% instead of 1.5%) (024)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.17 33.63 41.47 42.38
Effective retirement age 58.79 59.08 59.42 59.35
Unemployment rate 5.90 5.99 6.32 6.62
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1582 1573 1564
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 815 768 668 648
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.59 -1.32 -2.88
Net wages - -0.54 -1.06 -2.46
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -5.21 -17.85 -22.07
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.24 -17.60 -21.56
Capital/capita - -6.04 -19.19 -23.38
Consumption/capita - -3.95 -22.08 -28.75
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.53 18.04 20.36 19.95
Social security deficit 6.82 8.47 13.99 14.54
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.82 8.09 12.40 12.90
Pension deficit 4.57 5.23 8.30 8.43
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.57 5.00 7.36 7.48
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.67 0.53 0.51
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.93 0.74 0.66
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 16: Simulation results of lower pension benefits (-0.6% of GDP) (150)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.08 33.65 41.73 42.67
Effective retirement age 58.86 59.06 59.24 59.14
Unemployment rate 5.93 6.01 6.35 6.66
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1582 1573 1564
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 815 767 663 643
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.55 -1.34 -2.92
Net wages - -0.50 -1.07 -2.48
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -5.10 -11.24 -14.44
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.67 -17.54 -21.39
Capital/capita - -6.13 -19.84 -24.10
Consumption/capita - -7.95 -15.96 -20.01
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 16.88 18.06 22.02 21.98
Social security deficit 6.20 8.51 15.67 16.58
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.20 8.13 13.89 14.71
Pension deficit 3.94 5.26 9.98 10.46
Pension deficit (constant population) 3.94 5.03 8.84 9.28
Social security ratio: natives 0.74 0.67 0.50 0.47
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.95 0.92 0.71 0.63
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 17: Simulation results of higher contributions (+1.3% of GDP) (152)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.25 34.09 42.03 42.97
Effective retirement age 58.73 58.76 59.02 58.93
Unemployment rate 6.09 6.19 6.56 6.87
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1585 1581 1571 1562
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 809 757 655 635
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.13 -1.19 -2.75
Net wages - -2.61 -3.43 -4.78
Social security contribution - 6.70 6.70 6.70
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.57 -8.73 -12.23
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -5.89 -18.65 -22.46
Capital/capita - -7.10 -20.86 -25.05
Consumption/capita - -9.02 -17.67 -21.85
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.58 18.99 22.84 22.72
Social security deficit 5.82 8.53 15.67 16.53
Social security deficit (constant population) 5.82 8.15 13.89 14.67
Pension deficit 3.91 5.58 10.25 10.68
Pension deficit (constant population) 3.91 5.33 9.09 9.48
Social security ratio: natives 0.76 0.67 0.51 0.48
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.99 0.95 0.73 0.65
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 18: Simulation results of higher retirement age (+1.4 years) (151)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 28.71 32.44 40.41 41.41
Effective retirement age 59.14 59.89 60.17 60.05
Unemployment rate 5.97 6.01 6.30 6.61
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1585 1580 1570 1562
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 819 785 683 662
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.67 -0.69 -2.22
Net wages - -0.66 -0.49 -1.84
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.36 -6.15 -9.08
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -2.13 -14.41 -18.47
Capital/capita - -3.87 -16.60 -21.12
Consumption/capita - -4.62 -12.77 -17.02
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.23 18.10 22.55 22.67
Social security deficit 6.57 8.20 15.60 16.68
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.57 7.83 13.83 14.81
Pension deficit 4.30 5.06 10.10 10.75
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.30 4.83 8.95 9.54
Social security ratio: natives 0.73 0.68 0.51 0.48
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.94 0.73 0.65
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 19: Simulation results of lower pension benefits (-0.6% of GDP), of higher contributions
(+1.3% of GDP) and higher retirement age (+1.4 years) combined (054)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 28.69 32.45 40.42 41.41
Effective retirement age 59.16 59.89 60.16 60.05
Unemployment rate 6.19 6.26 6.56 6.88
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1583 1577 1567 1558
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 814 778 677 656
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.22 -0.38 -1.91
Net wages - -2.76 -2.72 -4.05
Social security contribution - 6.70 6.70 6.70
Pension payment per beneficiary - -5.18 -10.26 -13.28
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -2.82 -15.09 -19.11
Capital/capita - -4.38 -17.26 -21.76
Consumption/capita - -5.70 -13.39 -17.42
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 16.63 17.40 21.54 21.61
Social security deficit 4.95 6.58 13.75 14.83
Social security deficit (constant population) 4.95 6.28 12.19 13.16
Pension deficit 3.01 3.74 8.52 9.16
Pension deficit (constant population) 3.01 3.57 7.56 8.13
Social security ratio: natives 0.79 0.73 0.55 0.52
Social security ratio: foreigners 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.69
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 20: Simulation results of lower pension benefits (-3% of GDP) (160)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 28.83 33.01 41.26 42.21
Effective retirement age 59.05 59.50 59.57 59.48
Unemployment rate 6.05 6.14 6.47 6.79
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1584 1579 1569 1561
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 815 772 667 647
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.44 -1.07 -2.70
Net wages - -0.43 -0.84 -2.29
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -19.93 -24.71 -27.42
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.04 -16.90 -20.74
Capital/capita - -5.56 -19.37 -23.71
Consumption/capita - -8.39 -14.12 -17.45
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 14.36 14.94 18.36 18.38
Social security deficit 3.81 5.44 12.09 13.07
Social security deficit (constant population) 3.81 5.20 10.71 11.60
Pension deficit 1.50 2.16 6.36 6.91
Pension deficit (constant population) 1.50 2.06 5.64 6.14
Social security ratio: natives 0.82 0.75 0.56 0.53
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.99 0.99 0.78 0.70
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 21: Simulation results of higher contributions (+3% of GDP) (008)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.37 34.45 42.28 43.19
Effective retirement age 58.63 58.51 58.85 58.76
Unemployment rate 6.33 6.48 6.88 7.20
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1583 1578 1567 1559
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 801 746 645 626
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - 0.46 -0.91 -2.44
Net wages - -5.26 -6.35 -7.64
Social security contribution - 15.46 15.46 15.46
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.76 -9.76 -13.49
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -7.25 -19.89 -23.64
Capital/capita - -8.18 -22.03 -26.15
Consumption/capita - -10.56 -19.28 -23.38
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.66 19.15 22.71 22.51
Social security deficit 4.55 7.59 14.55 15.38
Social security deficit (constant population) 4.55 7.25 12.90 13.65
Pension deficit 3.09 5.00 9.46 9.84
Pension deficit (constant population) 3.09 4.78 8.38 8.73
Social security ratio: natives 0.81 0.71 0.54 0.51
Social security ratio: foreigners 1.05 1.00 0.77 0.69
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 22: Simulation results of higher retirement age (+3 years phased-in over 40 years) (019)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.14 32.94 38.30 39.39
Effective retirement age 58.81 59.55 61.66 61.52
Unemployment rate 5.92 6.03 6.49 6.75
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1580 1563 1555
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 814 776 708 686
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.45 -0.94 -2.00
Net wages - -0.44 -0.83 -1.71
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.33 -5.05 -6.11
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -3.30 -11.53 -15.35
Capital/capita - -5.05 -14.52 -18.48
Consumption/capita - -4.94 -10.80 -14.12
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.52 18.39 21.59 22.25
Social security deficit 6.81 8.60 14.14 15.67
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.81 8.22 12.54 13.91
Pension deficit 4.56 5.43 8.79 9.92
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.56 5.18 7.79 8.80
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.67 0.54 0.50
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.93 0.76 0.67
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 23: Simulation results of lower pension benefits (-3% of GDP), of higher contributions
(+3% of GDP) and higher retirement age (+3 years phased-in over 40 years) combined (055)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 28.92 32.41 37.75 38.79
Effective retirement age 58.98 59.92 62.05 61.95
Unemployment rate 6.51 6.71 7.18 7.45
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1579 1570 1552 1543
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 802 767 699 678
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - 0.66 0.04 -1.05
Net wages - -5.16 -5.65 -6.52
Social security contribution - 15.46 15.46 15.46
Pension payment per beneficiary - -20.10 -23.62 -24.76
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.25 -12.21 -15.88
Capital/capita - -5.69 -15.34 -19.27
Consumption/capita - -7.41 -10.54 -12.86
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 14.40 14.63 16.98 17.48
Social security deficit 1.48 2.79 7.55 9.01
Social security deficit (constant population) 1.48 2.66 6.70 8.00
Pension deficit -0.06 0.27 2.83 3.86
Pension deficit (constant population) -0.06 0.26 2.51 3.43
Social security ratio: natives 0.92 0.86 0.69 0.65
Social security ratio: foreigners 1.11 1.12 0.95 0.84
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 24: Simulation results of lower pension benefits (-5% of GDP) (011)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 28.69 32.61 40.94 41.89
Effective retirement age 59.16 59.78 59.80 59.71
Unemployment rate 6.13 6.25 6.58 6.90
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1582 1576 1567 1558
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 814 775 668 648
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.34 -0.89 -2.54
Net wages - -0.35 -0.67 -2.14
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -32.35 -36.18 -38.47
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -3.74 -16.54 -20.35
Capital/capita - -5.27 -19.13 -23.53
Consumption/capita - -9.01 -12.81 -15.52
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 12.33 12.45 15.33 15.41
Social security deficit 1.88 3.02 9.16 10.20
Social security deficit (constant population) 1.88 2.88 8.12 9.05
Pension deficit -0.48 -0.29 3.39 4.00
Pension deficit (constant population) -0.48 -0.28 3.01 3.55
Social security ratio: natives 0.90 0.84 0.62 0.58
Social security ratio: foreigners 1.03 1.06 0.85 0.76
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 25: Simulation results of higher retirement age (+5 years phased-in over 40 years) (203)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.13 32.36 35.87 36.94
Effective retirement age 58.82 59.95 63.39 63.29
Unemployment rate 5.94 6.09 6.62 6.85
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1586 1578 1554 1546
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 814 783 737 715
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.34 -0.37 -0.99
Net wages - -0.35 -0.36 -0.81
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.56 -6.20 -7.15
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -2.35 -7.31 -10.79
Capital/capita - -4.28 -10.73 -14.24
Consumption/capita - -3.13 -7.00 -9.33
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.52 18.02 19.95 20.63
Social security deficit 6.81 8.10 11.79 13.26
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.81 7.74 10.45 11.77
Pension deficit 4.55 4.96 6.64 7.75
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.55 4.74 5.89 6.87
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.68 0.59 0.55
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.94 0.82 0.73
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 26: Simulation results of higher retirement age (+9 years phased-in over 40 years) (207)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.11 31.22 31.21 31.73
Effective retirement age 58.83 60.74 66.68 67.05
Unemployment rate 5.97 6.17 6.76 6.87
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1585 1573 1528 1521
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 813 795 787 776
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.17 2.01 4.65
Net wages - -0.23 1.82 4.55
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.71 -6.03 -4.72
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -0.38 1.63 2.04
Capital/capita - -2.72 -2.56 -1.48
Consumption/capita - 1.05 1.87 4.10
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.50 17.36 17.31 18.14
Social security deficit 6.80 7.16 7.65 8.42
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.80 6.84 6.78 7.47
Pension deficit 4.54 4.10 2.95 3.63
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.54 3.92 2.62 3.22
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.67
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.87
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 27: Simulation results of pensions inflation indexation (003)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.16 33.81 41.73 42.65
Effective retirement age 58.80 58.95 59.24 59.16
Unemployment rate 5.93 6.01 6.36 6.67
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1582 1572 1564
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 814 765 663 644
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.50 -1.34 -2.90
Net wages - -0.44 -1.07 -2.46
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.84 -10.28 -14.13
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.96 -17.63 -21.40
Capital/capita - -6.35 -19.86 -24.07
Consumption/capita - -8.14 -16.32 -20.26
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.53 18.78 22.31 22.08
Social security deficit 6.82 9.24 15.95 16.67
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.82 8.83 14.14 14.79
Pension deficit 4.57 5.99 10.26 10.56
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.57 5.72 9.10 9.37
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.65 0.49 0.47
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.91 0.70 0.63
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 28: Simulation results of higher penalty in the pension corridor (5.2% instead of 2.1%)
(007)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 28.61 32.27 40.52 41.48
Effective retirement age 59.22 60.02 60.09 60.00
Unemployment rate 6.00 6.08 6.37 6.69
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1585 1579 1570 1562
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 820 785 680 659
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.74 -1.00 -2.63
Net wages - -0.75 -0.80 -2.25
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.99 -7.85 -11.08
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -2.28 -15.19 -19.14
Capital/capita - -4.31 -17.61 -22.00
Consumption/capita - -4.93 -13.33 -17.60
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.18 17.89 22.22 22.22
Social security deficit 6.49 7.99 15.41 16.39
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.49 7.64 13.66 14.54
Pension deficit 4.22 4.85 9.86 10.41
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.22 4.63 8.74 9.23
Social security ratio: natives 0.73 0.68 0.51 0.48
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.94 0.72 0.64
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 29: Simulation results of higher reference year for the pension corridor (65.5 instead of
62.5) (013)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.18 33.80 41.79 42.73
Effective retirement age 58.78 58.96 59.20 59.10
Unemployment rate 5.91 5.99 6.34 6.65
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1583 1573 1565
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 814 766 663 643
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.54 -1.37 -2.94
Net wages - -0.48 -1.10 -2.49
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -2.62 -10.42 -13.84
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.90 -17.68 -21.50
Capital/capita - -6.31 -19.91 -24.15
Consumption/capita - -8.02 -16.38 -20.47
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.53 18.63 22.30 22.19
Social security deficit 6.81 9.09 15.95 16.79
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.81 8.68 14.14 14.90
Pension deficit 4.56 5.84 10.26 10.68
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.56 5.58 9.10 9.47
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.65 0.49 0.47
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.92 0.70 0.63
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 30: Simulation results of the high migration scenario with budget closing SSC (045)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 105.69 118.78 121.94
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.75 27.22 34.21
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.01 48.64 50.86
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.20 34.44 43.58 43.65
Effective retirement age 58.76 58.32 57.22 57.75
Unemployment rate 5.96 6.77 9.60 9.64
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1589 1577 1541 1530
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 814 739 575 570
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - 0.00 0.96 0.08
Net wages - -7.17 -24.86 -24.34
Social security contribution - 24.42 94.13 89.84
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.43 -13.20 -20.33
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -8.70 -29.24 -30.47
Capital/capita - -9.68 -31.18 -32.46
Consumption/capita - -13.70 -26.57 -28.97
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.92 11.40 11.89
Pension expenditure 17.56 19.39 23.69 22.62
Social security deficit 6.79 6.79 6.79 6.79
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.79 6.42 5.72 5.57
Pension deficit 4.55 4.50 4.26 3.56
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.55 4.26 3.59 2.92
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.75
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 1.06 1.10 0.98
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 31: Simulation results of the main scenario with non-age dependent health costs (301)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.16 33.85 41.86 42.81
Effective retirement age 58.80 58.93 59.14 59.04
Unemployment rate 5.90 5.98 6.32 6.63
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1583 1573 1565
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 815 766 662 642
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.57 -1.41 -2.98
Net wages - -0.51 -1.14 -2.53
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.42 -7.94 -11.26
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -4.78 -17.52 -21.32
Capital/capita - -6.33 -20.00 -24.25
Consumption/capita - -6.41 -13.90 -17.52
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.28 8.84 8.81
Pension expenditure 17.53 18.88 22.94 22.89
Social security deficit 6.82 8.72 14.44 15.15
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.82 8.33 12.80 13.44
Pension deficit 4.57 6.08 10.89 11.36
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.57 5.81 9.66 10.08
Social security ratio: natives 0.73 0.67 0.52 0.49
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.86 0.87 0.72 0.65
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
59
Table 32: Simulation results of the main scenario with exogenous retirement decisions (350)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.11 33.99 42.36 43.19
Effective retirement age 58.83 58.83 58.79 58.77
Unemployment rate 5.91 5.96 6.32 6.64
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1583 1574 1566
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 816 764 656 637
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.63 -1.61 -3.21
Net wages - -0.56 -1.29 -2.73
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.38 -8.43 -11.94
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -5.15 -18.77 -22.48
Capital/capita - -6.50 -21.00 -25.17
Consumption/capita - -8.41 -17.45 -21.70
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 17.50 18.97 23.10 22.91
Social security deficit 6.79 9.46 16.91 17.65
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.79 9.03 14.99 15.67
Pension deficit 4.54 6.20 11.17 11.50
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.54 5.92 9.91 10.20
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.64 0.48 0.45
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.91 0.69 0.62
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
60
Table 33: Simulation results of the high migration scenario with exogenous retirement decisions
(351)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 105.69 118.78 121.94
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.75 27.22 34.21
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.01 48.64 50.86
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.11 33.71 41.39 42.26
Effective retirement age 58.83 58.83 58.79 58.76
Unemployment rate 5.91 5.99 6.42 6.59
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1583 1571 1563
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 816 766 662 645
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.88 -2.37 -2.48
Net wages - -0.78 -1.95 -1.91
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -1.42 -9.27 -13.15
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -5.05 -18.44 -21.30
Capital/capita - -6.53 -20.86 -23.43
Consumption/capita - -7.50 -16.51 -19.04
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.92 11.40 11.89
Pension expenditure 17.50 18.98 23.50 23.86
Social security deficit 6.79 9.34 16.83 17.71
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.79 8.84 14.17 14.52
Pension deficit 4.54 6.09 10.93 11.30
Pension deficit (constant population) 4.54 5.76 9.20 9.27
Social security ratio: natives 0.72 0.64 0.48 0.47
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.94 0.94 0.73 0.64
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 34: Simulation results of lower pension benefits (-3% GDP) with exogenous retirement
decisions (352)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.11 33.99 42.36 43.19
Effective retirement age 58.83 58.83 58.79 58.77
Unemployment rate 6.00 6.09 6.46 6.79
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1585 1581 1571 1563
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 812 760 652 633
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.40 -1.47 -3.09
Net wages - -0.33 -1.15 -2.61
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -20.11 -25.89 -28.78
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -5.73 -19.15 -22.79
Capital/capita - -6.85 -21.50 -25.69
Consumption/capita - -10.54 -16.62 -19.86
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 14.50 15.35 18.57 18.47
Social security deficit 3.95 6.09 12.71 13.52
Social security deficit (constant population) 3.95 5.82 11.26 12.00
Pension deficit 1.64 2.74 6.85 7.25
Pension deficit (constant population) 1.64 2.62 6.08 6.44
Social security ratio: natives 0.81 0.73 0.54 0.51
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.99 0.98 0.77 0.69
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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Table 35: Simulation results of lower pension benefits (-0.65% GDP) with exogenous retirement
decisions (355)
2011 2020 2050 2070
absolute numbers
Population (15+) 100.00 104.69 112.80 112.69
Share of foreigners 10.73 14.09 24.42 30.79
Dependency ratio 26.66 33.39 50.58 52.83
Pensioners (in % of population) 29.11 33.99 42.36 43.19
Effective retirement age 58.83 58.83 58.79 58.77
Unemployment rate 5.93 5.99 6.35 6.68
Employment (yearly hours per worker) 1587 1583 1574 1565
Effective employment (yearly hours per capita) 815 763 655 636
increase from basis in %
Labor costs - -0.58 -1.58 -3.18
Net wages - -0.51 -1.26 -2.70
Social security contribution - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pension payment per beneficiary - -5.44 -12.22 -15.59
increase from basis in %
GDP/capita - -5.27 -18.85 -22.55
Capital/capita - -6.58 -21.10 -25.28
Consumption/capita - -8.87 -17.27 -21.30
in % of basis GDP
Health expenditure 7.96 8.88 10.97 11.13
Pension expenditure 16.85 18.19 22.12 21.95
Social security deficit 6.18 8.73 16.00 16.76
Social security deficit (constant population) 6.18 8.34 14.18 14.87
Pension deficit 3.91 5.45 10.24 10.58
Pension deficit (constant population) 3.91 5.21 9.08 9.39
Social security ratio: natives 0.74 0.66 0.49 0.47
Social security ratio: foreigners 0.95 0.92 0.71 0.63
Notes: Social security ratio gives the ratio of total social security revenues over expenditure.
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